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NOTES
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS AS EVIDENCE IN INDIANA.-A confession in criminal law is a statement by a person, at any time afterward, that he committed or participated in commission of a crime.'
With this definition in mind let us try to determine when a confession
is admissible as evidence. The Indiana statute says: "The confession
of a defendant made under inducement, with all the circumstances, may
be given in evidence against him, except when made under the influence
of fear produced by threats or by intimidation or undue influence; but
a confession made under inducement is not sufficient to warrant a conviction without corroborating evidence." 2
Again in Hamilton v. State the court held that a confession of guilt
by accused is admissible against him when, and only when it was freely

1 State v. Dixson, 80 Mont.
2

181,

260 P. 138

(1927).

Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated § No. 9-1607 V. 4.
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and voluntarily made without having been induced by the expectation
of any promised benefit or by the fear of any threatened injury, or by
the exertion of any improper influence.3 Thus we begin to see that
voluntary confessions are admissible as evidence.
The next question that confronts us is, what constitutes a voluntary
confession. Generally confessions induced by the promise or encouragement of any hope, benefit, or favor made or held out by persons in
authority or others in their presence are inadmissible. 4 Confessions
induced by threats and fear as we saw from the statute quoted are inadmissible. 5
In Ogle v. State it was held that if defendant's confession was otherwise voluntary, it could not be rendered incompetent by the mere
circumstance that at the time of making it he was in the custody of
officers. 6 It is held, however, that a confession is not conclusive on
7
either the accused, the prosecution, or the jury.
Next we must examine the defendant's right to rebut the confession. The defendant has a right to show under what circumstances
the confession was made before it is admitted in evidence. However,
a confession is deemed' voluntary in absence of showing by the accused
to the contrary. In Thurman v. State the court said: "A confession
by a person accused of crime is presumed to be voluntarily made until
the contrary is shown." 8
After the court determines that a confession is competent the accused has the right to present to, the jury evidence tending to contradict or discredit it. In Mack v. State the court held "that in absence
of the jury, the court should hear evidence as to the circumstances under
which the confession was made, and the burden of proving the confession incompetent is upon the defendant." Going further, the court
said: "But after the court has determined that a confession is competent
and admissible and it is introduced in evidence, the defendant has the
right to present to the jury evidence as to the conditions under which
it was obtained, evidence that he did not make the confession, or
evidence which tends to contradict, discredit, or lessen the weight
thereof." 9
Having determined that voluntary confessions are admissible as
evidence let us next discuss the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession, for there is little question that a confession of guilt in open
8
4

207 Ind. 97, 190 N. E. 870 (1934).
Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N. E. 279 (1932).

5

Hamilton.v. State (3 Supra).

6 193 Ind. 187 (1920).
7 Hicks v. State, 213 Ind. 277, 11 N. E. (2d) 171 (1937).
8 169 Ind. 240, 82 N. E. 64 (1907). Also see: Hauck v. State, 148 Ind. 238
(1897) and Ginn v. State, 161 Ind. 292 (1903).
9 Mack v. State (4 Supra).
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court before the jury will support a conviction.' 0 As to extra-judicial
confessions, it was held in Gains v. State that: "In the case of all
extra-judicial confessions it is the rule that the corpus delicti must be
proved by additional evidence before a conviction upon the naked
confession will be upheld." 11 In Snyder v. State a confession before
coroner's inquest was held admissible.12
In Hamilton v. State, supra, it was held that confessions made by
a prisoner after he had been professionally advised of their effect are
admissible in evidence against him. 13 Similarly, in Manley v. State
the court said: "The fact that defendant told the policemen in answer
to questions asked in the presence of the wounded man, that he shot
Pemberton over a political argument and was sorry for it immediately
after Pemberton had identified him as the man who did the shooting,
was not inadmissible merely because defendant was under arrest at
the time." 14
In Hicks v. State the court maintained that the fact that accused,
charged with murder, was removed from place to place after his arrest
and held for a long time, did not make his written confession inadmissible, where it was not made under influence of fear produced by
threats, intimidation, or undue influence. 15
Other situations of interest may also be noted. In Anderson v. State
the court held that an admonition to accused to tell the truth and a
statement that making the confession would save him some time was not
a promise rendering the confession iniadmissible. 16
In State v. Laugklin it was held that the examination of the accused
by questions and answers taken down in shorthand in which the accused
admitted that he struck the deceased upon the )iead with the butt end
of a billiard cue, rendering him unconscious, on stating other details
of the fatal trouble, was admissible. 17
Thus we may conclude that in Indiana voluntary confessions are
admissible as evidence though by themselves they are not conclusive
of guilt. We further saw that after a confession has been accepted by
the court, the defendant has an opportunity to offer evidence showing
that the confession was not given voluntarily.
10

Dantz et. al. v. State, 87 Ind. 398 (1882).

Also see: Eastman v. State, 54

Ind. 441 (1876) and Griffeth v. State, 36 Ind. 406 (1871).

11 191 Ind. 262, 132 N. E. 580 (1921).
12 59 Ind. 105 (1877).
18 Hamilton v. State (3 Supra).
197 Ind. 583, 151 N. E. 403 (1926).
15 Hicks v. State (7 Supra).
16 205 Ind. 607, 186 N. E. 316 (1933).
17 171 Ind. 66, 84 N. E. 756 (1908).
14

NOTES
Confessions are important in criminal law today and although we
must ever be on the lookout for confessions obtained by force and intimidation, yet we must accept voluntary confessions with open arms
since the aid such confessions lend to the prosecution of criminals is
unmeasurable.
Arthur M. Diamond.

DFxAm-TIoN OF A

GRoup.7-In maintaining an action for defama-

tion it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defamatory matter
was directed toward him. In examining the ability of an individual
to maintain an action in libel or slander to himself when the defamation was directed against a group, of which he is a member, it would
seem only logical that the same rule should apply-that the plaintiff
must show that the defamatory matter is directed toward him. It is
noi enough that the group of which he is a member is the object of
slander or libel. The courts have been unanimous in holding the plaintiff
to proof that the defamatory matter is directed at himself,1 and it is
not enough for him to show that the class of which he is a member has
been defamed. 2 The difficulty of proving this imputation varies directly
with the size of the group. In Louisville Times v. Stiverss the court
said, "The plaintiff must be able to show he is the one against whom
the article is directed, that he is the one defamed. In a comparatively
small group this presents no difficulty. * * * As the size of the group
increases it becomes more and more difficult for the plaintiff to show
he was the one at whom the article was directed, and presently it becomes impossible. As a result of that, there are men who make their
living by circulating falsehoods against the Jews, Catholics, Masons,
and so forth, taking care to mention no names, and to make only
general charges against all, and are thus able to ply their nefarious
trade in safety because the group is so large that no particular individual can show the article is directed at him."
The reasons for such a rule are based on the well-known judical
refuge of Public Policy. In Ryckman v. Delavan,4 the court said, "It
is far better for the public welfare that some occasional consequential
injury to an individual arising from general censure of his profession,
his party, or his sect should go without remedy than that free discussion on the great questions of politics, morale, or faith should be
checked by the dread of embittered and boundless litigation."
1 Louisville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S. W. (2) 411 (1934).
2 Ryckman v. Delevan, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 186 (1840).
8
4

252 Ky. 843, 68 S. W. (2) 411 (1934).
25 Wend. (N. Y.) 186 (1840).
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In implementing these doctrines the courts have created an artificial distinction between groups according to size, the larger being
called classes and the smaller groups.5 A class is defined as a large
number of persons which may be designated by a single name, irrespective of geographic limitation, political division, or place of abode, while
group is used to designate a particular part or section of a class. Members of a class are said to have no right of action for defamation used
oroadly with respect to that class. However, if defamatory language
is used toward an entire group, including every member thereof, it may
be said to refer to each member to the extent that he may maintain
an action. 6
According to this distinction, families have been held to constitute
a class,7 and a group.8 In the former case, the defamatory matter complained of was contained in a newspaper article concerning a feud
between two families and referring to the plaintiff's family as the
"Stivers Clan." The court would not allow recovery to be sought in
a civil action, since it was not apparent that the defamatory matter
was directed at the plaintiff. In the latter case, however, under similiar
circumstances, libelous matter published about a family was held to
entitle any member thereof to maintain an action.
The courts have also differed on the classification of occupants of
a house. The owner of an apartment house who resided therein was
held to have no right of action against one who threw suspicion upon
the house and intimated it was a house of ill fame, where the owner
was not named or designated as being of questionable character.9 But
in another case,' 0 it was held that a newspaper article characterizing
a house .as disorderly was directed at each occupant of the house and
thus each had a cause of action for libel.
A race has been considered to constitute a class, so that no member
thereof could maintain an action for its defamation," but a written
attack on the jewish population of a city, consisting of 75 families, was
12
held to afford a right of action to any individual member.
A catholic clergyman has been held unable to maintain an action
for a defamation of catholic clergymen, generally, 13 although a libelous
publication concerning the vestry of a church gave a right of action
to any of the individual vestrymen. 14
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Swell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 121 S. E. 913 (1924).
People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907).
Louisville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S. W. (2) 411 (1934).
Fenstermaker v. Tribune Publishing Co., 13 Utah 532, 45 P. 1097 (1896).
Hyatt v. Lindner, 133 La. 614, 63 So. 24 (1913).
McLean v. New York Press Co., 64 Hun. 639 (1892).
Germain v. Ryan, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 53 C. S. 543 (1918).
Ortenberg v. Plamandor, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 24 K. B. 69 (1914).
People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907).
14 Goldsborough v. Orem, 103 Md. 761, 64 Atl. 36 (1906).
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An officer of a regiment has been held unable to maintain an action
for a libel on the officers of the regiment generally,' 5 but a member
of a court martial was held to have a right of action for a libelous
cartoon.' 6
The same rule has apparently been applied to defamation of persons
engaged in a business or profession. The courts have held that defamatory mafter concerning correspondence schools generally would not give
a right of action to any particular school,' 7 that an article condemning
certain practices of insurance agents was not libelous to an individual
insurance agent,' 8 but a newspaper article defaming the medical staff
of a public hospital was considered to constitute a libel to each of the
doctors as if he had been mentioned by name.' 0
Partnerships are generally regarded as groups, and a libel which
injures the partnership may be considered to injure each partner so
that each may maintain an action to recover the damage caused thereby
20
to his interest.
A defamation of a public board (district board of registry and election), leveled against it without exception, necessa'ily condemns every
member thereof although none are named and every member may maintain an action. 21 A member of a city council who was superintendent
of accounts and finances was allowed to maintain an action against a
newspaper publishing an article criticizing the city council and mayor
22
in respect to their conduct of the city's fiscal affairs.
It sometimes occurs that the group itself will attempt to recover
for libel or slander directed toward it. The difficulty encountered is
usually in getting into court, since, with the exception of corporate
bodies, groups are not recognized as entities in law. Cases of this
type are thus limited, with the exception of Trade Unions, noted below, to suits by corporations. In this connection, the legal personality
of a corporation has been regarded diversely by the courts. The majority of opinions appear to hold that the corporate personality is quite
different from that of a real person, so that it is necessary for the
corporation to show special damages in order to maintain an action.23
The rule as stated in a U. S. Supreme Court case, 24 is that a corporation can only be injured in respect to its credit, property or business
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22

Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns (N. Y.) 475 (1815).
Ellis v. Kimball, 16 Pick (Mass.) 132 (1834).
International Text Book Co. v. Leader Printing Co., 189 F. 86 (1910).
McGee v. Collins, 156 La. 291, 100 So. 430 (1924).
Bornmann v. Star Co., 174 N. Y. 212, 66 N. E. 723 (1903).
Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co., 105 N. Y. S. 294 (1907).
Reilly v. Curtiss, 53 N. J. 677, 84 AtI. 199 (1912).
Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., - W. Va. -, 26 S. E. (2) 209

(1943).
28

24

National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F. (2) 763 (1927).
Ibid.
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by a false publication. On the other hand, in a case where a charitable
and religious corporation was allowed to maintain the action,2 5 the
court said, "A corporation may therefore have a reputation which is
equally as valuable to it as that of a natural person and may be injured in that reputation in the same way," and supported this statement by the reasoning that if it were not allowed to maintain this suit,
it and other like corporations would become the prey of th6 libelor,
since, because they are non trading, they cannot show special damages.
Municipal corporations have not been allowed to maintain an action
for defamation, but upon totally different grounds. In a leading case
on this subject, 26 the court pointed out that maintainence of such an
action would seriously endanger such constitutional rights as freedom
of the press and of speech, and continued to state that a city should
not be allowed to maintain an action for damages for libel even though
publications are malicious and directed towards the city's private27 enterprises. A similiar succeeding case has adopted this reasoning.
In general, as before noted, a voluntary association, being unincorporated, has no legal personality and is thus unable to appear in
court. However, in New York, under its General Associations Law,
such associations have been endowed with some of the character of a
legal entity to the extent that they may sue and be sued. Outstanding are two cases in which trade unions have been allowed to maintain
actions for libel.2 8

In these cases it was held that the members of

a trade union, which was an unincorporated association, would have
such a common interest in the damages consequent upon the publication of an article, tending to injure the reputation of the work being
done by the union by charging wrongdoing on the part of the officers,
as would give rise to a cause of action for libel, which could be maintained, through its president, by regarding the union as an entity to
the extent necessary to permit such an action.
It is interesting, at this point, to note the difference in civil and
criminal liability for defamation of a group. In many cases in which
an individual or group was not allowed to maintain an action for
defamation of that group the court pointed out that the defamer would
be criminally liable.2 9 The court sums up the problem in People v.
Eastman, 0 saying, "The charges in this article being against a whole
class, no single individual could maintain an action for libel against its
author, but not so, however, as regards a criminal prosecution for libel.
The foundation of the theory on which libel is made a crime is that
25 Finnish Temperance Society v. Publishing Co., 238 Mass. 345, 130 N. E.
845 (1921).
595, 139 N. E.86 (1932).
26 City of Chicago v.Tribune Co., 307 Ill.
27 City of Albany v. Meyer, 99 Cal. A. 651, 279 P.213 (1929).
28 Kirkman v.Westchester Newspaper, Inc., 24 N. Y. S. (2)860 (1942).
29 Ryckman v.Delevan, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 186 (1840).
80 People v.Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907).
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by provoking passions of persons libeled, it excites them to violence
and a breach of the peace. Therefore a criminal prosecution can be
sustained where no civil action would lie, as for instance in this very
case, where the libel is against a clss."
John H. Merryman.

DismissAL OR REMOVAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS UNDER
TEACHERS' TENURE LAws.-As a basis to the consideration of the question of dismissal or removal of public school teachers under teachers'
tenure laws of various states, the following opinion is set forth which
contains a worthy exposition of the history of teachers' tenure legislation
and the purposes and motives behind that legislation:
"Teachers' tenure, like civil service and other similar movements,
dates back over a period of many years. The abuses existing by reason
of the 'spoils system' which came into prominence during Jackson's
administration, later followed by national and other administrations,
led to much-deserved criticism. That is why on January 16, 1883, the
first civil service act was passed. In 1885, the National Education
Association brought forth the question of tenure of school officials. A
committee of that association studied the matter and later submitted
a report. Generally speaking, the tenure so sought was interpreted to
mean, in substance, the application of the principles of civil service to
the teaching profession. It was thought for the good of the schools
and the general public'that the profession should be made independent
of personal or political influence, and made free from the malignant
power of spoils and patronage. In 1886 the state of Massachusetts
enacted a law 'relating to the tenure of office of teachers.' Thereunder school districts were permitted to enter into contracts with
teachers for a longer period than one year. In 1889 the committee
on rules of the Boston School Committee suggested a tenure law providing for a probationary period of one year, four years of annual'
elections, and thereafter permanent tenure subject to removal for cause
after proper hearing. The bases for recommendations were that better
talent would be attracted to the teaching profession; that annual contracts theretofore in vogue had not resulted in the elimination of poor,
incompetent, and inefficient teachers; that the principle of annual election or appointment was not generally applied to policemen, firemen,
or judicial officers, and in the very nature of things should not apply
to teachers; that not infrequently the best teachers were discharged for
inadequate reasons. Foreign countries have long recognized the principle of teachers' tenure. Since 1900 the principle of teachers' tenure
in this country has developed more rapidly. In a general way it has
followed the civil service plan. The objectives sought have been to
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protect the teachers against unjust removal after having undergone an
adequate probationary period; that the movement itself has for its
basis public interest, in that most advantages go to the youth of the
land and to the schools themselves, rather than the interest of the
teachers as such.
"Plainly, the legislative purposes sought were stability, certainty, and
permanency of employment on the part of those who had shown hy
educational attainment and by probationary trial their fitness for the
teaching profession. By statutory direction and limitation there is
provided means of prevention of arbitrarydemotions or discharges by
school authorities. The history behind the act justifies the view that
the vicissitudes to which teachers had in the past been subjected were
to be done away with or at least minimized. It was enacted for the
benefit and advantage of the school system by providing such machinery
as would tend to minimize the part that malice, political or partisan
trends, or caprice might play. It established merit as the essential
basis for the right of permanent employment. On the other hand, it
is equally clear that the act does not impair discretionarypower of school
authorities to make the best selections consonant with the public good;
but their conduct in this behalf is strictly circumscribed and must be
kept within the boundaries of the act. The provision for a probationary
period is intended for that very purpose. The right to demote or discharge provides remedies for safeguarding the future, against incompetence, insubordination, and other grounds stated in the act. The
act itself bespeaks the intent. Provisions for notice and hearing, the
requirements of specified causes for discharge or demotion, are indicative
of the general purpose. With these general considerations in mind,
it is our duty so to construe such parts of the act which on their face
do not clearly delineate the legislative intent as will bring about a
result in harmony with the expressed legislative policy." 1
"Tenure legislation of one sort or another is now in force in nineteen states and the District of Columbia. Three states provide for 'continuing contracts,' whereby a teacher's contract is deemed to continue
in existence from year to year unless, on or before a fixed date each
year, it is terminated by the school board. The other sixteen states
and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation modeled after
that adopted by New Jersey in 1909. Although varying in specific
details, the general pattern of these laws may be described briefly.
For a period ranging from one to five years, the teacher is on probation and during that time he may be denied re-employment at the end
of any school year, but dismissal during the year must be for cause.
If re-employed at the end of the probationary period the teacher then
holds his position without further election during efficiency and good
behavior. He may be dismissed only for cause, and only after notice
1 McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 202 Minn. 102, 277 N. W. 541 (1938).
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accompanied by written charges, opportunity to be heard, and a finding by the board that the charges filed against him are true. The
teacher is allowed the assistance of counsel, and the board is authorized to supoena witnesses for either side to give testimony under
oath. Some of the statutes make- the action of the board final, subject of course to judicial review with respect to the requirements of
due process of law. Others provide specifically for administrative appeals to higher 'educational board or official, or for appeals to the county
or district court. When enumerated, the grounds for dismissal include
dishonesty, immoral character or conduct, insubordination, physical or
mental incapacity to perform the duties of employment, persistent refusal to obey reasonable rules and regulations, and natural dimunition
in the number of pupils." 2
Tenure may be established also by regulations of a Board of Education incorporated in the teacher's contract. 8
The Supreme Court of Indiana states that the purpose of the Indiana
Teachers' Tenure Act was to protect the educational interests of the
state by the establishment of a uniform system of permanent contracts;
and it was not the purpose of the statute to foster the interests of,
or. create special privileges to, any teacher or class of teachers. And
the policy of the law was to establish a uniform tenure system for all
the schools of the state, and it must be construed liberally with that
4
aim and end in view.
The Pennsylvania court holds essentially the same way in the opinion
that the Teachers' Tenure Act .of Pennsylvania was designed to secure
the citizens of Pennsylvania a competent and efficient school system
by preventing dismissal of capable teachers without just cause; and it
is clear that the legislature did not intend that the act confer any special
privileges or immunities upon the teachers themselves to retain permanently their positions regardless of merit, or affect the future policy
of the legislature as to their employment. 5
The Ohio Supreme Court states that the purpose of the Teachers'
Tenure Act is not to secure absolute permanence of tenure to reemployed teachers eligible for continuing service status but to afford
them continuity of service and provide an orderly procedure for termination or suspension of such contract, and a board of education
may terminate such contract when statutory ground is shown to exist
subsequent to the effective date of contract.6
Tenure statutes are antedated by statutes in some states forbidding
school boards to execute contracts with teachers for more than a
2

B3.H. Lebeis, 37 Mich. L. R. 430-432 (1939).

8
4
5
6

State ex. rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont. 547, 92 P. (2d) 306 (1939).
School City of Lafayette v. Highley, 12 N. E. (2d) 927 (1938) (Ind.).
Teachers' Tenure Act Cases, 329 Pa. 213, 197 A. 344 (1938).
State ex. rel. Weekley v. Young, 141 Ohio 260, 47 N. E. (2d) 776 (1943).
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named period: "More than four school years" (Ohio), 7 "not exceeding the ensuing school year" (Iowa), 8 "not to exceed two years"
(Texas). 9 In the absence of such restrictions it is generally held that
a board may appoint a superintendent or teacher for any reasonable
period, even beyond the term of theboard itself. 10
The Teachers' Tenure Act extends to the superintendent of schools
of a city, and his status is the same as that of a permanent teacher
11
under an indefinite contract. 4
However, in one jurisdiction it was held that the superintendent
of schools employed by the board of education of the Independent
School District of Duluth is not a "teacher" within the Teachers'
Tenure Act, and that the board acted within its power in discontinuing
his employment upon expiration of contract, though he had served as
12
superintendent for seven years.
The power to dismiss or remove is generally vested in the school
board or authorities who have the power of employing teachers and
of controlling and managing the school, 13 except where the law, or
rules and regulations, provide that the power of removing or dismissing a school-teacher shall be in some other particular board or officer;
and where the power to dismiss is not expressly placed in a particular
officer or board, it is generally held that it exists by implication in
14
the officer or board having the power to employ.
In one jurisdiction, it has been stated that generally the policy of
the general assembly is that a board of directors or a board of education as such has no authority to hear charges against and remove a
school teacher or a school superintendent. 15
One of the primary considerations which arise with regard to dismissal or removal of public school teachers under teachers' tenure
laws is the question of whether those teachers occupy a contractual
status, arLd the determination of the rights thereto.
In California, the court has held that "These and other expressions
of California courts compel the conclusion that tenure in California,
under the 1921 amendments to the Political Code, and under the terms
of the present School Code, is statutory and not contractual; that there
7

Ohio General Code No. 7691 (1937).

8

Iowa Code No. 4229 (1931).

9

Comp. Texas Stats., Art. 2781 (1928).
Tate v. School Dist., 324 Mo. 477, 23 S. W. (2d) 1013 (1929).
11 School City of Peru v. State ex. rel. Youngblood, 212 Ind. 255, 7 N. E.
(2d) 176 (1937).
12 Eelkema v. Board of Ed. of City of Duluth, 215 Minn. 590, 11 N. W.
(2d) 76 (1943).
18 Baird v. Fremont Co. School Dist. No. 25, 41 Wyo. 451, 287 P. 308 (1930).
14 Tadlock v. Guadalupe Co. School Dist. No. 29, 27 N. M. 250,. 199 P. 1007
(1921).
15 State ex. rel. Brokaw v. Board of Ed. of City of St. Louis, 171 S. W. (2d)
75 (1943) (Mo. App.).
10

NOTES

,

is no contractual relationship between the teacher and the State of
California; that the tenure provisions of the law did not become a
part of the teacher's contract of employment, but rather are restrictions upon the power of the school district to dismiss a teacher after
he has been employed under specified cdnditions for a certain length
of service. Certainly there is a contract- of employment between the
school district and the teacher and the terms thereof are carefully prescribed by the statutes and explained by cases .... The maximum
term of employment is one year . . . .Nowhere is there any term of
the contract relating to permanent tenure nor, significantly enough, is
there any provision anywhere in the School Code or in any statute requiring the teacher to remain in the service of the school district, once
he has obtained tenure, as long as he is physically, mentally and
morally able, or giving the school district a cause of action against
the teacher for breach of contract if the teacher resigns without leave
of the district at the end of any school year after the teacher has
acquired tenure." 18
The same court said that under well-recognized principles of law,
a legislative act which would, if construed to be a contract, limit or
extinguish the power of the government completely to control the subject matter of the enactment, will not be so construed unless the legislative intention to create the contract clearly appears, and all doubt
must be resolved in favor of the continuance of the power of the government; and that the reservation of such power to the government
was clearly indicated by the legislature in the enactment of the statute
providing that all employment under the provisions of the Teachers'
Tenure Act should be subordinate to the rights of the legislature to
amend or repeal that statute or any provision thereof at any time, and
that nothing therein contained should ever be held, deemed or construed to confer upon any person employed pursuant to the provisions
thereof, a contract which would be impaired by the amendment or repeal of the statute or any provision thereof. 16 The court in this case
relied upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in two
cases.17 18
But submitting to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in another case, 19 reversing decisions of the Supreme Court of Indiana,
to the effect that the tenure rights of a permanent teacher were purely
statutory and not contractual and were therefore subject to being dissolved by the repeal of the act out of which they arose, the court
recognized that a teacher who after serving for a period of five or
more consecutive years had entered into a contract to teach for another
16 Taylor v. Board of Education, 89 P. (2d) 148 (1939)
1?
18

Phelps v. Board of Education, 57 S. Ct. 483 (1937).
Dodge v. Board of Education, 58 S. Ct. 98 (1937).

19

Anderson v. Brand, 58 S. Ct. 443 (1938).

(Calif. App.).
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year, and had, prior to the repeal of the Teachers' Tenure Act, thereby
acquired the status of a permanent teacher with an indefinite contract,
continued in that status notwithstanding the subsequent repeal of the
statute. The court, in recognizing that status, said that the decision
of the United States Supreme Court went no further than to hold that
the rights of the teacher arose out of contract and as such were entitled to the protection of the United States Constitution with respect
to impairment of obligations of contract, and did not consider the precise
nature of the contractual rights acquired or the manner of their enforcement.
Conceding that in other jurisdictions various conclusions have been
reached upon the question of whether teachers employed under the
Teachers' Tenure Act occupy a contractual status, depending upon the
statute involved in each case, the court held that under the Pennsylvania
statute expressly requiring a school district, within thirty days after
the enactment of the Teachers' Tenure Act, to tender to all the professional employees of the district then employed new contracts drawn
in accordance with the form prescribed in the statute, it was useless
to say that the school teachers did not have contracts of employment,
because the legislature had expressly so provided. The court pointed
out that assumpsit by school teachers for the enforcement of contractual
rights has been recognized in that jurisdiction; and that in this respect
the teacher's position differed from that of other governmental employees who held their positions solely by tenure of appointment, without express contractual rights.5
But the contract of a school teacher with the state, under the
Pennsylvania Teachers' Tenure Act, is a qualified contract, in that it is
subject to the limitation of its operation by subsequent statutory
changes. 5
Also, it has been held in Pennsylvania, where a teacher's contract is
specifically made subject to the provisions of the School Code, "and
amendments thereto," the quoted phrase is broad enough to include
future amendments as well as those existing at the time the contract
was entered into; and where an amendatory act took effect prior to
the date of the teacher's suspension, and at a time when her contract
was in full force, it was held that the amendment was automatically
incorporated into the contract existing between her and the school district, and the right of the teacher must be controlled by the amendatory
20
act.
In Indiana, the court has held that a permanent tenure teacher's
indefinite contract is a protected contractual right entitling the teacher
to a succession of definite contracts with terms meeting the require21
ments of pertinent statutes.
20
21

Bragg v. School Dist., 337 Pa. 363, 11 A. (2d) 152 (1940).
Engel v. Mathley, 113 Ind. App. 458, 48 N. E. (2d) 463 (1943).
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In another jurisdiction it has been held that the status of a permanent
teacher under the Teachers' Tenure Act, while in a sense contractual,
is, in essence, dependent on a statute, like that of an incumbent of a
may abolish at will, or whose
statutory office which the 2legislature
2
emoluments it may change.
Although there is a conflict of authorities as to whether the status of
teachers under Teachers' Tenure actually is or is not contractual, the
general rule may be laid down that a contract to teach school is clothed
with the same sanctity as other contracts and cannot be avoided except
23
for grounds recognized by law.

The rules of law relating to performance and breach generally apply
to contracts between teachers and school authorities. 24 Thus a teacher
was allowed to recover damages for breach of contract of tenure, and
also, in a second suit brought by plaintiff teacher, she received a judgment for salary since the25first judgment, although in the interval she
had rendered no services.
With respect to the validity of contracts between teachers and school
authorities, the general contract requirements of mutual assent, consideration, and fraud must certainly be applied as tests of whether a
binding contract has been formed in addition to determining whether
the specific statutory requirements have been fulfilled. There must
be mutual assent at the time of formation of the contract, that is the
parties must agree as to every provision of the contract; the element of
consideration must be present, that is, something of legal detriment to
the promisee or of some benefit to the promisor, or the doing of some act
on the part of the promisor which he is not legally bound to do; and,
according to the statute of frauds, if the agreement is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, it must be in writing,
or some written memorandum thereof, and must be signed by the party
26
to be charged.
A teacher is bound to take notice of all statutory provisions controlling and for that reason incorporated into the contract 'as one of its
terms,27 and of all the rules of the school board which may affect the
inconsistent with the
power to dismiss, although insofar as they are
28
statute, his rights will not be affected thereby.
A teacher, by entering into a contract under the Teachers' Tenure
Law must be deemed to have agreed that the contract might be canceled
22 Steck v. Board of Education, 8 A. (2d) 120 (1939) (affirmed in 11 A. (2d)
260 (1940).
23 Walker v. State ex. rel. Kirton, 13 Fla. 14, 13 So. (2d) 443 (1943).
24 Cons. School Dist. No. 4, Bryan Co. v. Millis, 139 P. (2d) 183 (1943)
(Okla).
25 Board of Ed. of Washington Co. v. Cearfoss, 168 Md. 29, 176 A. 486
(1934).
26 Wiliston's Cases on Contracts, pages 1, 169, 415.
27 Chehock v. Marion Indep. School Dist., 210 Iowa 258, 228 N. W. 585
(1930).
28 De Hart v. St. Louis Co. School Dist. No. 39, 214 Mo. App. 651, 263 S. W.
242 (1924).
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by the board of trustees, and the teacher is not entitled to a hearing
before any other body than that provided for in the statute. 29
With respect to recovery, a teacher wrongfully prevented by the
board of trustees of the school district from occupying a position as
teacher in the school which he had previously occupied for seven consecutive years was entitled to recover salary lost as a result thereof
and until he could find other employment. 3 0
Many interesting cases have come before the courts with regard to
this question of the authority of school boards and administrative
groups to "hire and fire" public school teachers. The teachers' tenure
statutes which govern teachers' contracts have been interpreted in the
courts through the years with regard to the many points of law that
have arisen in the cases. As a final consideration of the question of
dismissal or removal under teachers' tenure laws, we shall point out
some of these important judicial interpretations.
It has been held in New York that the school directors or the school
board having, under the Education Law, control, management, and
direction of teachers and other employees of school districts may, unless prohibited by statute, discharge a teacher employed by them for
incompetency or for neglect in the discharge of duties; and where such
teachers have a tenure of office, such directors or board of education
may file or hear charges against the teachers and act thereon as the
evidence warrants, subject only to such review of the decisions as is
provided by statute. The charges must be received and acted upon in
good faith and not arbitrarily, and they must include a dereliction on
the part of the teacher, or neglect of duty, or something affecting his
character or fitness for the position, and must not precede a predetermined removal. 81
An interesting case on this point is one in which the statements
made by a permanent teacher to his pupils that it was silly and foolish
to salute the American flag, that Russia had the best government in
the world and the United States had the worst, that Russia had always paid its debts, that it was this country which had not paid its
debts, that the United States was the agressor in every war, and that
the United States was a bully among nations and took advantage of
all smaller nations, his disapproval of the attendance of his pupils at
the movies to view a patriotic moving picture, his distribution to his
pupils in the classroom of pamphlets commenting on communism and
on the case of Thomas J. Mooney, whom he described as a greater
martyr than Abraham Lincoln, and his statement to his pupils that he
would rather be a live coward than go to war, and that if the United
States became involved in war he would have nothing to do with it,
Arburn v. Hunt, 207 Ind. 61, 191 N. W. 148 (1934).
80 Srmith v. School Dist. No. 18, Pondera Co., 139 P. (2d) 518 (1943) (Mont.).
31 Cooke v. Didge, 229 N. Y. S. 257, (1937) (N. Y.).
29

NOTES
were held to be sufficient evidence of his unfitness to be the teacher
of children of an impressionable age, to constitute unprofessional conduct, and to be a violation of his oath, which he took as a teacher to
obtain his credentials, to support the Constitution and laws of the
United States and of the state of California, and to give undivided
allegiance to the Government of the United States, to furnish sufficient
32
ground for his dismissal under the School Code of California.
A case on the same point, but not quite as strong arises in a Florida
jurisdiction, wherein the dismissal was upheld of a public high school
teacher who obtained a 4-E draft classification as a conscientious objector. He was opposed to participation in the war in any form, either
Upon learning these
in the combatant or in the noncombatant service.
facts, the county board of education dismissed him from service in the
school system, finding his attitude wholly inimical to the ideals of citizenship and the responsibilities of citizens, notwithstanding his admitted
qualifications for service in the school system in other respects. The
teacher sought by a mandamus action to compel the board to reinstate him, but the trial court set aside the writ and on appeal, the
Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the decision saying: "The realtor's
qualifications, as clearly manifested by the record, failed to conform
with the requirements of our law, and the respondent board's conclusions are within the spirit of the law." 33
It has been held that a teacher holding a contract under the Teachers'
Tenure Act, providing that the only valid cause for termination of a
contract in accordance with the provisions of the statute should be
immorality, incompetence, intemperance, cruelty, wilful and persistent
negligence, etc., may be discharged for incompetency where the evidence shows that she acted as a waitress in a restaurant conducted by
her husband, and on certain occasions served as bartender after school
hours and during the summer vacation; that she, in this restaurant,
and in the presence of her pupils, took an occasional drink of beer,
served beer to the customers, shook dice with customers for drinks,
played, and showed customers how to play a pinball machine on the
premises; and that she was rated by the superintendent of schools as
43 per cent competent - a rating of 50 per cent being the passing or
average rating. The court said that the term "incompetency" has a
common and approved usage, and that its meaning is3 4not limited to a
lack of substantive knowledge of the subject taught.
"Incompetency" as used in the Teachers' Tenure Act making incompetency a valid cause for termination of contract with the professional employee of a school district also embraces a lack of physical
ability to perform duties incident to the employment. The physical
Board of Education v. Jewett, 21 Col. App. (2d) 64, 68 P. (2d) 404 (1937).
State ex. rel Schweitzer v. Turner, 19 So. (2d) 832 (1944) (Fla.)
34 Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Twp. School, Dist., see 135 Penn. Sup. 102, 4 A.
(2d) 601 (1939).
32

33
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inability of a dental hygienist employed by the school district to perform her duties for several months due to pregnancy constituted "incompetency" warranting her discharge under the Teachers' Tenure
Act.3 5
However, quick temper and an uncontrolled tongue, although very
serious delinquencies on the part of a teacher, not to be excused, are
correctible faults, and are, therefore, within the contemplation of a
statute requiring the school board not to act to dismiss a permanent
teacher upon charges of incompetency, except upon at least ninety
days' prior notice of such incompetency, specifying the nature thereof
with such particularity as to furnish the employee an opportunity to
correct his faults and overcome his incompetency. 3 6
Two absences without leave on the part of a permanent teacher may
not be considered as a "persistent" course of conduct violative of the
rules of the school board prohibiting absences without leave except for
sickness, within the contemplation of a statute which makes persistent
violation of such rules of the school board ground for dismissal of a
permanent teacher. 8 6
The phrase "other good and just cause" within the Teachers' Tenure
Law authorizing cancellation of teachers' contracts for enumerated
causes and for "other good and just cause" has been held to include
"lack of cooperation" and any cause which bears reasonable relation
37
to a teacher's fitness or capacity to discharge duties of his position.
"Good cause" within the statute authorizing dismissal of a teacher
employed at discretion includes any ground put forward by the school
committee in good faith which is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable or irrelevant to the committee's task of building up and maintaining an efficient school system, and the cause assigned is sufficient if8sat
least fairly debateable and asserted honestly and not as subterfuge.
School authorities have been held vested with discretion to dismiss a
permanent tenure teacher for cause other than those specifically enumerated in statute, limited only by statutory provisions that additional
causes must be good and just, and that dismissal may not be for personal or political reasons.3 9
And so, a teacher's candidacy for public office was not a ground for
cancellation of his contract as a permanent teacher, but a general rule
applying to all teachers requiring any school employee who becomes a
candidate for any elective political office to take a leave of absence
85 Appeal of School Dist. of Bethlehem, 347 Pa. 418, 32 A. (2d) 565 (1943).
36 Fresno City High School Dist. v. De Caristo, 92 P. (2d) 668 (1939).

Stiver v. State ex. rel. Kent, 211 Ind. 380, 1 N. E. (2d) 1006 (1936).
Rinaldo v. Dreyer, 294 Mass. 167, 1 N. E. (2d) 37 (1936).
89 McQuaid v. State ex. rel. Sigler, 211 Ind. 595, 6 N. E. (2d) 547 (1937).
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without pay was not an unreasonable exercise of the school board's
statutory powers warranting judicial interference. 40
For there to be a dismissal or removal of tenure teachers, there
must be some cause, as it has been ruled that boards of education have
power to dismiss teachers from employment for cause only,4 1 and the
term "cause" in the statute authorizing dismissal of school teachers and
42
superintendents for cause meant a cause sufficient in law.
With regard to superintendents, it has been held that the board of
school trustees could upon hearing and trial properly cancel the contract of a city superintendent of schools, who was a permanent teacher
serving under an indefinite contract, for insubordination and refusal
to obey directions of the school board after giving him written notice
of the charges against him and giving him an opportunity to appear
4
at a hearing.
Where, after transfer of a tenure teacher'from the position of school
superintendent to the principalship of a school, he declined to accept
the principalship and brought an action to enjoin the board of school
trustees from transferring him, and there was also evidence that he
had counseled and abetted strife in the school, had shown partiality in
permitting a teacher to teach without a license, had lowered other
teachers' success grades because they were not friendly to him, and
had sought to have a teacher make a payment to secure a position,
the board was justified in holding him guilty of insubordination. 1 '
In relation to married women teachers, the Massachusetts rule of
the school committee that marriage on the part of a permanent woman
teacher should operate as an automatic resignation, that no married
woman should thereafter be elected as a permanent teacher, and that
no married woman already in the service shall thereafter be employed
as a permanent teacher, unless she proves to the satisfaction of the
school committee that she is living apart from her husband and receiving no support from him, or that her husband is physically or mentally
disabled, so that he is unable to provide for her support, has been held
to be within the policy-making power of the school committee, and is
not unconstitutional on the ground of discrimination. 43
But in Indiana, a school board's rule that a woman teacher's marriage
automatically terminates her service has been held unreasonable, so
that disobedience thereof was not "insubordination" justifying can40 School City of E. Chicago v. Sigler, 219 Ind. 9, 36 N. E. (2d) 760 (1941).
41 Hartman v. Board of Ed. of Westville Tp. H. S. Dist. No. 220, 356 In.
577, 191 N. E. 279 (1934).
42 Graves v. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80, 12 N. E. (2d)

176 (1937).
48 Houghton v. School Committee of Somerville, 306 Mass. 542, 28 N. E.

(2d) 1001 (1940).
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cellation of a woman teacher's contract. 44 However, marriage was a
"good and just cause" for the cancellation of a tenure teacher's contract, where the contract was made with specific reference to, and with
full knowledge of, the rule or policy adopted in good faith against the
retention of a married woman teacher.3 9 That a teacher did not disclose to the school board her recent marriage, and signed a teaching
contract by her maiden name, held not "insubordination," and justifying
45
the contract under the statute.
In Pennsylvania, a teacher's violation of the school board rule forbidding female teachers to marry would not be a ground for the termination of a teacher's contract under the Teacher Tenure Act, since
46
the board was not empowered to make such a rule.

But a teacher who has not completed her probationary period may
be lawfully dismissed, although the reason therefor is a47policy of the
school board not to employ married women as teachers.
In addition to the enumerated causes for which a tenure teacher may
be dismissed there exist generally under the tenure laws other grounds
for the removal of a teacher which do not relate in any way to the
ability or character of the teacher, but rather to the economic conditions and educational methods of the district. (The provisions for
notice or hearing do not generally apply to this type of situations.)
So, where the board was empowered to make a reduction in the
number of teachers in the interest of economy, it was held that a
teacher who had been employed under a general contract to teach in
the public schools, and had by service of more than three years come
under the protection of the statute providing for indefinite tenure, could
not be dismissed for reasons of economy, while other teachers not protected by the tenure statute, any of whose places the tenure teacher
was competent to fill, were retained in employment, despite the fact
that the prosecutrix had been detailed to teach a special class which
was later merged with the general group of pupils. Discussing the
rights of the tenure teacher, the court said: "She has the same standing
as the other teachers under similar general contracts, with the added
advantage of indefinite tenure arising from three years of service, as
against those who have not served that length of time. Granting that,
apart from statute, a school board may in the interest of economy
reduce the number of teachers, the protection afforded by the statute
would be little more than a gesture if such board were held entitled to
make that reduction by selecting for discharge teachers exempt by law
therefrom, and retaining the nonexempt. If such reduction is to be
made at all, and a place remains which the exempt teacher is qualified
44
45

46

A.

Kostanzer v. State ex. rel. Ramsey, 205 Ind. 536, 187 N. E. 337 (1933).
McKay v. State ex. rel. Young, 212 Ind. 338, 7 N. E. (2d) 954 (1937).

Goff v. School Dist. of Borough of Shenandoah, 154 Pa. Sup. Ct. 245, 35

(2d) 902 (1944).
47

State ex. rel. Schroeder v. School Directors, 225 Wisc. 444, 274 N. W.
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37

to fill, such teacher is entitled to that place as against the retention of
a teacher not protected by the statute." 48
Where non-tenure teachers were discharged in compliance with a
court order requiring reappointment of tenure teachers, but were retained in their positions and formally re-employed as special sfibstitute
teachers, it was held that madamus would lie to compel the reinstatement of additional tenure teachers to replace the substitute teachers
regularly employed, by whatever title they were designated, the court
declaring that the action of the board was a mere "subterfuge" to
49
avoid the effect of the Tenure Act.
The provision of the Teachers' Tenure Act of Pennsylvania, for termination of a teacher's tenure contract upon a natural decrease in the
number of students refers generally to enrollment in a course, school,
or district; and when there is a decrease of students in a course due
to the establishment of another department, such a decrease is one due
to natural causes, and if a teacher is thereby rendered unnecessary to
50
the proper operation of the school, his contract may be terminated.
And when an entire department is abolished for valid reasons, which
may include financial ones, in the interest of a more efficient system,
the teachers in that department can be dismissed, although they have
the status of tenure teachers, under the Tenure Act. 51 Also, when a
teacher contracts under the Tenure Act of Pennsylvania, the contract
is subject to the provisions that his contract be terminated if the district school in which he teaches is joined with those of another district; and such provision is a condition subsequent, which, when fulfilled, extinguishes the relation between the teacher and the board and
52
terminates the contract.
The Chicago Board of Education my transfer a principal from elementary to high schools, or vice versa, in conformity with its rules and
statutes as the best interest of the respective schools may require, and
the transfer of a high school principal to an elementary school principalship without cause was not a "removal" contrary to the statute.5 3
A similar rule has been laid down by the court in Indiana," and in
West Virginia. 54
48 Sedel v. Board of Education, 110 N. J. L. 31, 164 A. 901 (1933), (affirmed
in 168 A. 297) (1933).
49 Downs v. Board of Education, 12 N. J. Misc. 345, 181 A. 688 (1935).
50 Jones v. Holes, 6 A. (2d) 102 (1939) (Pa.).
51 Ehret v. Kylpmont School Dist., 333 Pa. 518, 5 A. (2d) 188 (1939).
52 Walker's Appeal, 2 A. (2d) 770 (1938) (Pa.).
53 People ex. rel. McCoy v. McCahey, 296 Ill. App. 310, 15 N. E. (2d) 988

(1938).
See note 11,
55 Rowan v. Board of Education of Logan Co., 123 W. Va. 406, 24 S. E.
(2d) 583 (1943).
54
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But in Montana, the board of trustees of a school district has no
power to transfer a teacher from a higher to a lower grade, since assigning a teacher to a, lower grade is a "removal" to the same extent
that a dismissal would be. 30 However, under the Montana statute,
where one of the conditions of employment was that the board rereserved the right to close the school for lack of attendance, as they
were authorized to do under the express terms of the statute, the trustees had the right to close the school and thus avoid the contract of
3
employment for the current year. 55
In Ohio, it has been held that a county board of education, after
having created the position of county superintendent of schools, could
thereafter abolish the position and terminate the contract of the one
holding the position upon showing that such an action was motivated
by a reduced school enrollment with consequent reduction of school
revenues and by necessary requirements of economy, and was not required to continue the position indefinitely. 56
The Minnesota court has stated that the Teachers' Tenure Law was
not intended as a guaranty of continuous employment during health
and good behavior regardless of whether the number of pupils or the
availability of positions justifies the continued retention of teachers.57
In conclusion, it is stated that under established legislative policy,
school committees and boards are given the general management of
the public schools including the election and dismissal or removal of
teachers and such committees and boards have administrative control of
the school systems and are responsible for the proper functioning of
the schools. 58 The school directors can exercise their statutory power
to dismiss a teacher for cause, notwithstanding that the teacher may
have been employed under contract for a definite period of time. 59 A
teacher with a tenure contract under the Teachers' Tenure Act may
not be dismissed by the school board without the mention of the
statutory ground for terminating the contract, and the board could not
characterize the move as being economical, efficient, and prqductive
having that be sufficient grounds for such dismissal, for it would amount
to saying that whenever the board deemed a teacher unnecessary for
20
any reason whatever the contract may be successfully terminated.
Certainly that arbitrary action would not conform with the purposes
Moses v. School Dist., 107 Mont. 300, 86 P. (2d) 407 (1938).
56 State ex. rel. Frank v. Meigs Co. Board of Ed., 140 Ohio 381, 44 N. E. (2d)
455 (1942).
57 State ex. rel. Ging v. Board of Ed. of City of Duluth, 313 Minn. 550, 7
N. W. (2d) 544 (1942).
58 Davis v. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 30 N. E. (2d)
401 (1940).
59 Cadman v. School Directors of School Dist. No. 14, Winnebago Co., 288
Ill. App. 627, 6 N. E. (2d) 246 (1937).
55a
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and motives of the teachers' tenure laws. The causes set forth in those
laws which authorize the preferment of charges for the discharge or
removal of a tenure teacher are exclusive of all other causes, and the
school board may not undertake to add to those causes a cause of their
own creation. 60
Alfred E. Kuenzli.

ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT LIENS IN INDIANA.-The general procedure for levying executions in Indiana is regulated in detail by statute,
so that statutory sources must be th6roughly consulted when any question of execution arises.
Sec. 2-3601 Bums' Ind. Stat. provides in substance that when a
writ of execution issues to a sheriff from a court of competent jurisdiction, he must levy upon the judgment-debtor's property and make at
least one offer to sell the property levied upon within sixty days. All
property of the defendant is prima facie liable to execution; and so
remains until some claim for exemption is interposed.1 In order to
constitute a levy. on personalty within the contemplation of the statute,
possession thereof must be taken by the sheriff.2 Leaving property
with the judgment debtor is an abandonment of the levy.8 It should
be noted that proceedings commenced to review the judgment on which
an execution is issued does not prevent a levy and sale under this
section. 4
An injunction will lie to prevent illegal sales of property under an
execution.5 And if the property fails to sell6 for enough to pay the
amount due, the judgment will not be satisfied.
In. Sec. 2-3602 Burns' Ind. Stat., the execution debtor is given the
right to designate what property he wishes the levy to be made on.
Where a question of suretyship is involved, the property of the principal
is by law to be sold first, unless the surety shall direct otherwise. 7 Current coin and lawful money of the United States are a proper subject
of a levy. 8 Where this is done, of course, the money is merely turned
over to the judgment creditor, as a judicial sale would be obviously
60

Knoxville v. State ex. rel. Hayward, 133 S. W. (2d) 465 (1939)

(Tenn.).

1 Terrell v. State ex rel Grubbs, 66 Ind. 570 (1879). Stark v. Lamb, 167
Ind. 642, 78 N. E. 668 (1908).
2 McPherson v. Beckner, 132 Ind. 371, 31 N. E. 950 (1892).
8 Brown v. Loesch, 3 Ind. App. 145, 29 N. E. 450 (1891).
4 State ex rel Holiday v. King, 30 Ind. App. 398, 66 N. E. 85 (1902).
5 Sec. 2-3605, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933).
6 Dehority v. Paxon, 115 Ind. 124, 17 N. E. 259 (1888).
7 Sec. 2-3605, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933).
8 Sec. 2-3606, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933).
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absurd. Sec. 2-3607 et seq. provide for the handling of bills, notes,
drafts, and choses in action generally, and for their assignment by sheriff
to purchasers at judicial sales. By virtue of another section, mortgaged
chattels may be levied on and sold subject to the conditions of the
mortgage. 9
Another section of Title 2 defines the various interests in real prop0
erty which may be reached in execution:'
"The following real estate shall be liable to all judgments and attachments, and to be sold on execution against the debtor owning the
same, or for whose use the same is holden, viz: First. All lands of
the judgment debtor, whether in possession, remainder or reversion.
Second. Lands fraudulently conveyed with intent to delay or defraud
creditors. Third. All rights of redeeming mortgaged lands; also, all
lands held by virtue of any land-office certificate. Fourth. Lands or
any estate or interest therein, held by any one in trust for or to the use
of another. Fifth. All chattels real of the judgment debtor."
And in construLife estates in lands may be sold on execution."
ing specification number five of this statute, the Indiana Supreme Court
in Kohring v. Bowman held that a mechanics' lien may attach to and
be.enforced against a leasehold interest in land with option to purchase,
such leasehold interest being treated as an interest in land under this
section. 12 Another statute provides that in all cases where the personal
estate (personal property) of the debtor subject to execution is sufficient
to satisfy the execution, the real estate shall be exempt from levy and
sale until the personal estate is levied upon and sold, unless the debtor
exercises his right of designation under Sec. 2-3602.1
No property can be sold on execution in Indiana without an appraisement thereof. Unless waived by the judgment debtor, he has
the legal right to insist that his property sold on execution bring at least
two-thirds of the appraised cash value, exclusive of liens and enSec. 2-3704 outlines the mechanics of selecting the
cumbrances. 1 4
appraisers. This is a matter of detailed statutory regulation and need
not be fully explored here.
An execution defendant may retain possession of personal property
up to the time of the sale by delivering to the sheriff a written undertaking, payable to the execution plaintiff, with sufficient surety to be
approved by the sheriff, to the effect that the property will 15be delivered
Such reto the sheriff at the time and place of the proposed sale.
9 Sec. 2-3612, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933).
10 Sec. 2-3613, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933).
11 Reed v. Ward, 51 Ind. 215 (1875).
12 194 Ind. 433, 142 N. E. 117 (1924).
is

Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-3614.

34 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-3701. See also Stockwell v. Byrne, 22 Ind.
6 (1864).
15 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-3801.
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tention by the debtor is conditioned, however, upon proper appraisement made under the supervision of the sheriff.'
Where the debtor
breaks the conditions of the undertaking, the judgment plaintiff may
bring suit thereon.' 7 If a surety on a delivery bond is compelled to
pay the debt of the execution creditor, he is subrogated to the rights
of such creditor and has a lien on the property levied on.
Previous notice of the time and place of the sale of personal property
levied upon must be given for ten days successively by posting written
notices in a least three of the most conspicuous places in the township
where the sale is to be made.' 8 The sale is public, and the bidding is
competitive.
Where realty is being sold on execution, the procedure appears to
be quite different. The time and place of making the sale must be
advertised by the sheriff for at least twenty days successively next before
the day of the sale, much in the manner of advertising the judicial sale
of personal property, except that the period of advertisement is longer.
Also, the sale must be advertised for three weeks successively in a newspaper of general circulation, printed in the English language, and published in the county where the real estate is situated, where such a
newspaper is available.' 9 Real estate is sold at public auction "at the
door of the court-house of the county in which the same is situated; and
if the estate shall consist of several lots, tracts and parcels, each shall be
offered separately; and no more of any real estate shall be offered for
sale than shall be necessary to satisfy the execution, unless the same
is not susceptible of division * * * * * )20
After realty is sold, as described in the foregoing paragraph, it becomes the duty of the sheriff to issue to the purchaser a certificate of
purchase in lieu of a sheriff's deed. Execution by the sheriff of a deed
would, of course, be impossible because of the redemption features of
the law which will be explained shortly.
Upon the issuance of the certificate of purchase by the sheriff, the
law requires that the clerk shall immediately record the certificate in
the iBs Pendens Record. The purpose of such recordation is to give
constructive notice to the public of the fact that the land has been
judicially sold subject to redemption. Other provisions of this section
relate to the assignability and indorsement of these certificates, and
provides for their devolution by way of testate or intestate succession. 21
A defective title does not release the bidder from payment of the pur16 Bums'
17 Burns'
I8 Burns'
'9
Bums'
20 Burns'
21

Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-3802.
Ind.
Ind.
Ind.
Ind.

Stat. Ann.,
Stat. Ann.,
Stat. Ann.,
Stat. Ann.,

Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

2-3805.
2-3901.
2-3903.
2-3904.

Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-3909.
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chase price; in "Weaver v. Guyer the Supreme Court of Indiana said
that there is no warranty in judicial sales, the rule of caveat emptor
applying. 22
If real property is sold on execution for more than will satisfy the
execution, including interest and costs, the sheriff is directed by law
to pay the excess over -to the execution debtor, unless he has been
28
notified of the existence of subsisting liens.

In the event of a failure of title, the purchase-money is not recoverable from the execution creditor. 24 But by statute the purchaser In
such a case becomes subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the
debtor, to the extent of the money paid and applied to the debtor's
benefit; and where the judgment has been entered satisfied, in whole
or in part by reason of the sale, the purchaser, upon notice to the
parties to the proceeding, may have the entry of satisfaction vacated,
and his lien for the full amount automatically attaches upon the
property.2 5
Sec. 2-3919 provides in substance that the owner of realty sold on
execution against him shall be entitled to the postession of the same
for one additional year. At any time during this year of grace, the
execution defendant can redeem the property by paying to the clerk
of the court the amount of the purchase-money, and interest at the
rate of eight per cent per annum. 26 Redemption may be had by owner,
his legal representative, heirs or devisees. Immediately upon such redemption being made, the clerk shall make another entry in the Lis
Pendens Record indicating the extent of the redemption and by whom
redeemed. The trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor may redeem lands
sold.

27

The nature and extent of the sheriff's duties and liabilities on his
official bond are set out at length in Secs. 2-4101 et seq. There is no
need that they be recited here. Other sections of Title 2 deal with
the so-called capias writs, proceedings supplementary to execution, and
the garnishee law, none of which bear directly upon the subject of
this paper.
David S. Landis.

59 Ind. 195 (1877).
Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-3916.
Lewark v. Carter, 117 Ind. 206, 20 N. E. 119 (1888).
25 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-3918.
22
23
24
26
27

Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. Sec. 2-4001.
Elston v. Castor, 101 Ind. 426, 51 Am. Rep. 754 (1887).

NOTES
MuNIcIPAL ADVERTISING -

Is ITS PURPOSE PRIVATE OR PUBLIC.-

The modern municipality is a highly complex organization confronted with many problems which were not thought of, or at least
not to as serious a degree, a century ago. A city of today wants to
grow, become more efficient, obtain more industry, and more transportation facilities. As a result, some municipalities have turned to advertising as one means of encouraging people to immigrate to their city.
In many instances, such expenses are incurred by the Chamber of
Commerce, but there are occasions where the city has attempted to
levy a tax to cover the cost of such advertising. It is at this point
where the controversy arises. Is allocation of municipal funds for such
purposes a private or public interest?
If it is found that the use of public funds for municipal advertising
is a private purpose, no legislature can authorize nor compel such use
of the funds. "A state legislature can neither authorize nor compel a
municipal corporation to expend any of its funds for a private purpose,
and consequently, since every undertaking of a municipality does or
may require the expenditure of money, a municipal corporation cannot,
even with express legislative sanction, embark on any private enterprise, or assume any function which is not in a legal sense public." I
They go on to say, "It is generally conceded that a municipal corporation has no implied power to expend its funds for providing refreshments, entertainments, and dinners for delegates to a convention; or
for entertaining at a supper or a ball; or indeed for the purpose of
extending hospitality or furnishing social pleasures either to citizens or
invited guests." 2 The article goes on to say that in the commemoration of historical events, money can oftentimes be expended, but even
here, there must be an express grant of power.
In Loeb v. City of Jacksonville,8 a taxpayer attempted to have a
certain item on the budget declared illegal. The municipality had included in its budget several thousand dollars for advertising purposes.
The plaintiff contended that such use of the money was not for a public purpose. The city contended that it had the power to levy a tax
for the advertising of the city, its properties, and, generally, as a place
to live or set up business. The lower court upheld the defendant city's
contention on the grounds that the city itself was in business in selling
electricity, water, dockage, amusement, and gas, and that therefore,
they should be permitted to advertise these. The decision of the lower
court was reversed upon appeal and the ordinance was held void as
the court said: " * * * the function of government is the enactment
and enforcement of rules of conduct for the people within its territories
1 19 R. C. L., title, Mun. Corp. Para. 19.
2 19 R. C. L., title, Mun. Corp. Para. 99.
3 J. B. Loeb, Appt. v. City of Jacksonville et al., 101 Fl. 429, 134 So. 205,
79 A. L. R. 459 (1931).
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in order to secure opportunities for the enjoyment of the so-called
inalienable rights, which include the pursuit of happiness by the people
within the territory, and not to induce other people from other states
and territories to migrate to the territory to enjoy them."
The reverse has been held true in Texas. Here, the municipality's
right to advertise has been upheld. The court said that wide powers
had been granted by a constitutional amendment known as the "Home
Rule Amendment." The charter of the city of San Antonio permits
ordinances which are necessary " * * * for the order and good government of the city or for the trade, commerce, and health thereof." The
charter also gave the city the privilege of using special funds for this
purpose. The court states, "We think the constitution and the laws
of Texas do not inhibit the taxation assailed; and, under the provisions
of the charter, we think that sufficient authority is given for a levy
and collection of the advertising tax. It is clear that the taxation is
for a public purpose and not a private purpose. If trade and commerce
are increased by advertising, everyone would, to some extent, receive
benefits from it." 4
In a California case, the municipal charter permitted such use of
city funds. In Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens, the
plaintiff attempted to force by mandamus the defendant treasurer of
Sacramento to honor a warrant for $235 in payment of a claim for the
printing of a pamphlet called "The Key To Sacramento." The plaintiff
had an agreement with the city to advertise the city and charge only
the actual expense to the city. The city charter authorized allocation
of special funds " * * * to aid or carry on the work of inducing immigration to the city, to exhibit manufactured products of the city, and
generally for the purposes of advertising the city." To this the court
merely added, "We are of the view that, by common consent, it is
now generally held to be well within a public purpose for any given
locality to expend public funds, within due limitations, for advertising
and otherwise calling attention to its natural advantages, its resources,
its enterprises, its adaptability for industrial sites, with the object of
increasing its trade and commerce and of encouraging people to settle
in that particular community." 5
In New York, there must be a public interest. The case of Lewis
v. LaGuardia was an action by a taxpayer of the city of New York
for an injunction to restrain the defendants from allowing broadcasts
by the Holy Name Societies of city departments over station WNYC,
a municipally owned radio station. The Holy Name Societies are
organizations of Catholic city employees. They hold communion
4 San Antonio v. Paul Anderson Co., Tex. Civ. Appeals, 41 S. W. 2d 108
(1931).
5 Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens, 212 Cal. 607, 299 P. 728

(1931).
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breakfasts in local hotels and have distinguished speakers for their
broadcasts. The St. George's Society, is a similiar organization for
Protestants, and they also broadcast their programs. For that reason,
there seems to have been no discrimination as to religion. The municipal
authorities claim that such broadcasts are of public interest and are not
for the advancement of a particular religious faith. The law permitting
the broadcasts stated that programs may be broadcast, " * * * which
are deemed appropriate and necessary for the public interest and advantage," and among the specific examples were " * * * entertainments
and functions of civic bodies and organizations such as * * *-associations and societies of members and employees of any of the city departments * * *." The judge held, "There is nothing in the evidence before me that at past Communion Breakfasts there have been broadcast
matters which may be said to constitute sectarian religious propaganda,
of no interest to the general public and not within the scope of matters
properly the subject of broadcasts by the Municipal Broadcasting Station. The speeches are educational and cultural in character. That they
may also stress the-importance of religious ideals is no reason for prohibiting their broadcast over this station." 6
If however, an advertising expense arises within a city, and the city
has already paid the expense prior to the institution of an action prohibiting payment, the New Jersey court said, "We have carefully examined the other matters argued and find no reason to review the same

since the advertising has been paid for * *

*."

7

In summing up, the general rule has been stated as" *** it may,
perhaps, be stated as a rule that, in absence of legislative authority,
found either in a city charter or in a special statute, a municipality has
no power to make expenditures for advertising or other forms of publicity." 8
Roger D. Gustaffon.

NATIONAL SERVICE LIFE INSURANCE.-With the mobilization of over
ten million fighting men the federal government became not only the
possessor of the strongest fighting force in the history of warfare but
it also became the largest life insurance company in the world. For
every man or woman, enlisted or commissioned, serving in the armed
forces of the United States is eligible for life insurance under federal
law.1 The insurance is provided at unusually low premiums and over
6 Lewis v. LaGuardia, mayor et al., 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 991 (1939).
7 In Re Carrick, 22 A. (2d) 561, 127 N. J. L. 316 (1941).
8 79 A. L. R. 467 annotation.
1 38 U. S. C. A. 511.
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ninety per cent of all military personnel have availed themselves of the
act. The act, known as the National Service Life Insurance Act or
perhaps commonly known as War Risk Insurance Act, provides not only
for benefits upon the death of the insured but also upon the occurrence
of total permanent disability.
A few important points of the National Service Life Insurance Plan
or the 5 year Level Premium Term Insurance are:
1. It may be continued in force for 5 years from the date it went
into effect.
2. It is called "term" Insurance because it remains in effect for
period or term-5 years.
limited
a
3. By "level Premium" is meant that the premium remains the
same or "level" for the full 5 years, whether you are in or out of
service.
4. It does not build up a savings fund and has no cash or loan
value.
This form of Insurance is open to all those persons in active service in
the land or naval forces. Those who are entitled to apply for National
Service Life Insurance include: (1) Commissioned officers; (2) Warrant
officers; (3) enlisted personnel; (4) members of the Army Nurse Corps;
and (5) members of the Navy Nurse Corps. To be eligible for this
insurance such persons must be serving under orders to active duty
not limited to a period of less than 31 days.
This insurance will be granted to any one person in any multiple
of $500, but not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000 provided that
no person may carry at any one time a combined amount of National
Service Life Insurance and U. S. Government Life Insurance.
In the case of the death of the policyholder, the policy will be paid
out to his beneficiary in the form of monthly income. Two factors
will determine the amount of monthly income: (1) the age of the
beneficiary at the time of death; and (2) the amount of insurance
owned. If the beneficiary is under the age of 30 at the time of the
death of the policyholder, a monthly payment of $5.51 per thousand,
or $55.10 on a $10,000 policy, will be for 20 years; or, such beneficiary
may elect to receive monthly payments which will continue for his lifetime. If, however, the beneficiary is age 30 or over, he must receive
monthly payments on a lifetime basis. At the present time no lump
sum settlement can be made. Such a settlement may be provided by
legislation after the war ends.
National Service Life Insurance has a valuable disability clause for
which no extra premium is charged. It provides that if the policyholder should suffer a disability prior to reaching age 60, which lasts
for six consecutive months or longer, he may notify the Veterans' Administration of the circumstances, and if the claim is approved, the
government will waive all premium payments as long as he is so dis-
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abled. However the policyholder must c3ntinue to pay the premiums until the claim is approved, but when approved, the premiums paid from
the commencement of the disability will be refunded. The government
insurance has no restrictions as to occupation, residence, travel, or
military service.
The present insurance may be changed over or "converted" to one
of three permanent plans of insurance or to any combination of them
without the necessity of having a physical examination. This change
over may be accomplished anytime after the policyholder has had his
5 year term policy for one year, and prior to the end of the 5th year.
It may be converted to the Ordinary Life Plan, 20-Year Pay Life, or
30-Year Pay Life, or to any combination of these three plans. The
cheapest plan, Ordinary life, will cost approximately twice the present
premium, 30-Year Pay Life, about 22 times, and the 20-Year Pay
Life about three times the present premium. The present policy may
be converted merely by requesting the necessary form from the Veterans'
Administration. This form must be filled out and forwarded to the
Veterans' Administration accompanied by the correct premium for the
new plan of insurance selected. The three permanent plans of insurance to which the policyholder may convert are mathematically
equivalent - one is no better than another. For each there will be some
particular one of these three plans that will be best suited to a veteran's
particular needs and income. A qualified and reputable commercial life
insurance agent may be of help in making the best selection. In this
regard, it is important to know that no commercial company can offer
similar plans of insurance at as low a rate as the government insurance
policy. Because of. this fact, all commercial companies strongly
recommend the keeping of government insurance and plan to convert
as much of it as the policyholder can afford.
The premium rate is the net rate based on the American experience
table of mortality and the assumption that the funds will be invested
and the interest will be earned at the rate of 3 per cent per annum.
It is a guaranteed level premium, computed for payment on a monthly
basis, but may be paid monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or annually.
If the premium is paid on other than a monthly basis, a discount at
the rate of 3 per cent per annum is allowed on the monthly premiums
paid in advance. In the event of maturity by death, the discounted
value at 3 per cent per annum of the premiums paid in advance beyond
the current month shall be paid to the beneficiary.
The provision covering total permanent disability seems certain to
take on added importance because of the ever growing number of
wounded men from all theatres of operations who are released daily
from military hospitals and because of the general magnitude of the
present conflict. Courts in adjudicating future cases will unquestionably
be guided by decisions of previous litigation arising out of the first
World War and the early act and it is in these cases that we chiefly
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shall find the trend, the established rules, hazy though they may be,
and the basis of decisions of cases yet to come.
The words "total permanent disability" are by their very subjective
nature incapable of an adequate definition. For this reason no attempt
is made in the act to define the term. The only provision dealing with
a definition is one that is superimposed upon the act and one that does
not by its insertion prejudice any other cause of disability. This particular provision states that the permanent loss of the use of both feet,
of both hands, or of both. legs, or of any two appendages or the loss
be considered
of hearing of both ears or the organic loss of speech shall
2
total permanent disability for purposes of the statute.
Courts have long decided that in the determination of the total
permanent disability of a petitioner the individual facts surrounding
each case must be the controlling factors and because of the intrinsically subjective nature of the term, no definite standards can be relied
upon in such cases. The courts have said that the terms of the act,
particularly the one dealing with total permanent disability, must be
interpreted in a reasonable sense for in one case we find the court saying: "Total permanent disability as used in the act must be taken in the
reasonable and practical sense, relative to the status of the beneficiary,
and to be determined by circumstances of his particular case." 8
It is clear from the holdings of many cases that the insurance benefits do not extend to either total temporary or partial permanent disability but only to total permanent disability. And it is equally certairi
total permanent disability does not mean the absolute incapacity to
perform any work. A. L. R. states the rule to be that: "It is well
settled that a disability does not cease to be total because of the insured's intermittent business activities, if without the exercise of ordinary care or prudence they are engaged in at the risk of substantially
aggravating the ailment with which he is afflicted. 4 Courts have followed the rule rather closely for in Lumbra v. U. S., a leading case on
the question, we find the Supreme Court of the United States saying:
"It may be assumed that occasional work for short periods by one
generally disabled by impairment of mind or body does not as a matter
of law negative total permanent disability." 5
Equally well settled is the fact that the inability to pursue a particular trade or profession or to perform the same kind of work that
had been done before the war is not total permanent disability within
the meaning of the statute. In the Lumbra (supra) case we find the
court stating: "It cannot be said that injury or disease sufficient,
merely to prevent one from again doing some work of the kind he had
38 U. S. C. A. No. 512c.
8 Law v. U. S., 290 Fed. 972 (1923).
2

4

73 A. L. R. 351 annotation.

5 290 U. S. 551 (1933).
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been accustomed to perform constitutes the disability meant by the
act." 6
Perhaps the most practical rule to be gathered from the manifold
adjudications on the problem is the rule that there must be such impairment or capacity as to render it impossible for the assured to follow
continuously some substantially gainful occupation. If the element
that precludes him from following a gainful occupation is mental as well
as physical it is total permanent disability within the meaning of the
act. This definite rule has been followed in many cases the entire
case revolves itself into the single determination by the jury as to
whether or not the claimant is able to follow continuously some substantially gainful occupation. If he is not able then he is totally permanently disabled. That a mental condition may be the causal factor
7
in total permanent disability is well settled and U. S. v. McPhee is
a leading case on this point.
The question as to when a total injury or disability is permanent
seems to have been answered in the case of U. S. v. Meserve when the
court, after repeating the rule as to following a gainful occupation as
laid down in the McPhee case said: " * * * and such disability is
deemed to be permanent whenever it is founded upon conditions which
render it reasonably certain that it will continue throughout the life
of the person suffering from it." 8
The origin or the cause of the disability is not relevant or material
and it appears that even congenital conditions will not invalidate the
disability benefits of the insurance if the disability occurs while the
policy is in force. American Jurisprudence lays down the general rule,
substantiated by a host of adjudicated cases to be: "A policy of war
risk insurance covers any permanent total disability that occurs while
the insurance is in force and the cause of the disability is not of importance. If the disability takes place while the insurance is in force,
it is immaterial that it is due mainly to congenital defects, or that in
origin it dates back before the service of the insured, as the disability
benefits are not limited to disabilities due to war service." 9
Although the origin is not relevant it is incumbent upon the plaintiffservice man to prove that the disability existed before the insurance
lapsed or in other words the plaintiff must prove that the disability
was in existence at the time the policy lapsed. Equally clear it seems
is the fact that the burden of proof to prove total permanent disability
is upon the plaintiff. In La March v. U. S. we find the court saying:
" * * * but the burden was only on the plaintiff to prove total permanent disability, and that such disability arose during the life of the
policy." 10 Courts generally, if not universally, seem to lend their as8 Ibid.
7 31 Fed. (2) 243 (1929).
8 44 Fed. (2) 540 (1930).
9

10

29 American Jurisprudence 1565.
28 Fed. (2) 828 (1928).
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sistance to the service man in carrying this burden of proof for in the
La March case we find the Supreme Court saying: "Mere inability on
his part (the plaintiff's) to prove the exact time and place of his injury to his hip was not fatal to his case." 11 This seems to be the
general attitude courts have assumed towards this element of procedure.
Other courts have followed the conclusion that the evidence should
always be construed more strongly in favor of the petitioning service
man for in the Lumbra case we find: " * * * And, for its decision, we
assume as established all the facts that the evidence supporting petitioner's claims reasonably tends to prove and that there should be
drawn in his favor all the inferences fairly deducible from such facts." 12
The importance of the total permanent disability element in the
National Life Service Insurance Act is attested to by the host of
cases arising out of the first World War. That it will assume even
greater importance and proportions after this present conflict is ended
seems inevitable. To find workable and consistent rules to aid in adjudicating future claims will not be too difficult if the courts keep
within legal sight of the cases arising out of the first war and by so
doing the tribunals when called upon to decide claims will do substantial justice both as to the claimants who, when called upon, responded to their nation's aid in a national emergency, and to the citizens generally who must bear the burden of the almost unbelievable
costs of the insurance program through his taxes. And who, although
wanting to give the returning veteran his full measure of benefits,
appalls the vision of courts allowing veterans monetary compensation
for surreptitious claims of total permanent disability.
Change of Beneficiaries Under the War Risk Insurance Act. The
only case to come before the courts under the Federal National
Service Insurance Act, construing the act in relation to an attempted
change of beneficiary, Bradley v. United States et al.13 Eugene
Morris, a flying officer in the United States Army, obtained a ten
thousand dollar insurance policy on his life under the National Service
Insurance Act. His mother was made beneficiary. Several months
later he married, and shortly after the marriage he expressed his intention to make his wife, Anna Mae Morris, the beneficiary of the.
policy in the place of his mother. However he delayed, perhaps fearing
the paper work, until he died in the course of his duty without having
effectuated the change of beneficiary in the usual way.
The day before his demise, however, he filed a "Personal Report"
with his commanding officer, in which he stated his desire that his wife
be made beneficiary of his policy.
11
12
13

Ibid.
290 U. S. 551 (1933).

143 Fed. (2) 573 (1944).
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Upon being apprised of Morris's death, the Veteran's Administration determined that the change was effecuated, and notified the wife
that she would receive the payments. The mother objected, and alleged
that an agreement existed between herself and her daughter-in-law,
which purported to divide the proceeds of the policy in two, equally.
The trial court upheld the decision of the Veteran's Administration,
saying that the change had been made.
In the Federal Court of Appeals it was decided that first there
was no agreement between the mother and the wife. For one reason
it was clear that he did not intend to make them both beneficiaries,
and second any attempt to" divide the proceeds constituted an assignment specifically prohibited by statute.1 4
454a "Payments of benefits due or to become due shall not be assignable, and such payments made to or on account of a beneficiary
under any of the laws relating to veterans shall be exempt from the
claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure
by or under any legal or equitable process whatever .... "
Of course where the Veteran's Administration had received no notice
of the change by the insured, in writing, or in the usual manner, the
burden of proving such change will rest with the one claiming the
change had been made.
Although the Veteran's Administration may waive requirements of
the notice in writing for the change of beneficiary, it does not have
the power to adjudicate the question of whether a valid change of
beneficiary had been effected.
It was held that where the insured had manifested the desire and
intent to change beneficiary, and had done everything within his power
to accomplish that purpose, leaving only ministerial acts to be performed by the insurer, court of equity would deem as done that which
ought to have been done, thereby giving effect to the intent of the insured. But in this case Lt. Morris did not do all in his power. He
could have done the task in the regular way, and had many opportunities for so doing. So the court further held that the expressed intention of the insured to change his beneficiary, standing alone and
unaccompanied by some affirmative act having for its purpose the
effectuation of his intention, is insufficient to effect the change of
beneficiary, and the court will not act where the insured has not first
attempted to act for himself.
"In every case involving war risk insurance wherein the courts have
recognized and decreed a change of beneficiary, the facts have amply
shown not only an expressed intention, but positive and unequivocal
acts on the part of the insured, designed to effectuate his intentions."
14 38 U. S. C. A. 454a.
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The plaintiff greatly relied on the "Confidential Report," but it
was of no avail, because the Veteran's Administration, the insurer, was
a complete stranger to it, and there was nothing to show that the purpose of it was to change the beneficiary. It was neither a notice nor
a direction, but rather an expression of belief in a set of facts.
A side light to the case was the decision that an allowance of attorney's fees to be paid in a lump sum out of accrued payments was
unauthorized, under the statute allowing reasonable fees for attorneys
in war risk litigation, to be paid out of the payments allowed under
the judgments at a rate not exceeding one tenth of the sum recovered. 15
A strong dissent was registered in the case by Judge Phillips, who
said in his opinion:
"In the report, referred to in the majority opinion, (The Confidential
Report), the insured stated that he had the policy of insurance and that
the beneficiary thereunder was Anne M. Bradley, his wife, and that
the policy was in her possession. That he believed that by making
such statement in the report and by delivering the policy to his wife
he had effected the change of beneficiary is manifest by the fact that
immediately thereafter he told his wife he had 'taken care of the insurance at the Army Base.'"
He claimed that in war risk insurance cases involving changes in
beneficiary, courts should brush aside legal technicalities in an effort
to effectuate the manifest intention of the insured.
From Johnson v. White, 16 this passage was quoted in the dissenting
opinion:
"The intention, desire and purpose of the soldier should, if it can
reasonably be done, be given effect by the courts, and substance, rather
than form should be the basis of the decisions of courts of equity. The
clearly expressed intention and purpose of the deceased to have his
wife named as the beneficiary in this insurance should control, and
should not be thwarted by the fact that all the formalities for making
their purpose effective may not have been complied with."
Francis J. Paulson.
Harold Berliner.
Thomas Bremer.

15
16

38 U. S. C. A. 51.
39 Fed. (2d) 793 (1930).
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SOLICITATION TO Cpmm.-The purpose of this paper is to cover some
of the cases dealing with the question of solicitation to commit a crime
as a substantive common law offense. Corpus Juris1 holds that "although it has been maintained that a mere solicitation to commit is not
indictable, except in a few cases, by the weight of authority it is an
indictable offense at common law to solicit another to commit any crime
amounting to a felony, although the solicitation is of no effect and the
crime is not in fact committed." Thus it has been held a crime to solicit
larceny or embezzlement, arson, murder, sodomy or adultery is a felony,
or to utter counterfeit money or forged bills. One who solicits another
to commit a felony is guilty of a misdemeanor only, if the felony is not
committed. If the felony is committed, he is guilty as accessory before
the fact, if absent, and as principal in the second degree, if present, at
the time of its commission.
The courts are well agreed that one inciting or soliciting another to
commit a crime which, either by the common law or by statute, is a
felony, commits a substantive crime recognized and punished by the
common law. In State v. Schleifer2 it was held as certainty of what
is or is not a crime is essential to the safety of the individual, a solicitation to commit a crime should be held a crime in every instance where
an attempt to commit the same offense would be a crime, stating that
such rule is practicable, definite and understandable and is just.
An early Nevada case 8 held that the solicitation of an attorney to
employ money corruptly to influence the jury is indictable under the
common law, as a solicitation of another to commit the crime of embradery. The Canadian case of Rex v. Cole 4 held that an incitement
or solicitation to give false evidence, or to give particular evidence regardless of its truth or falsehood, is a misdemeanor at common law,
punishable by fine and infamous corporal punishment.
In State v. Sullivan 5 the court states: "In those jurisdictions where
it prevails the common law is a standing declaration that whoever
solicits the commission of a felony is guilty of a misdemeanor. It is
not a declaration that whoever solicits the commission of an offense
which is a felony at any given time shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
but it is a declaration that whoever solicits the commission of an act
which is a felony at the time solicited is guilty of a misdemeanor. In
Missouri the statute makes it a felony to bribe a legislative officer. If
the defendant solicited that he be bribed, he solicited the commission
of a felony and he, therefore, committed a common law misdemeanor."

1 16 Corpus Juris 117.
2 99 Conn. 432, 121 Atl. 805, 35 A. L. R. 835 (1923).
8 State v Sales 2 Nev. 268 (1866).
4 3 Ont. L. Rep. 389, 5 Can. Crim. Cas. 330, 22 Can. L. T. 132 (1921).
5 110 Mo. App. 75, 84 S. W. 105 (1904).
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In an early English case 6 it was held that to solicit a servant to
steal his master's goods was a misdemeanor, indictable and punishable
at common law. Lord Kenyor, Ch.J., said in this case: "It would
be a slander upon the law to suppose that an offense of such magnitude
is not indictable. I am also clearly of the opinion that it is indictable at the quarter sessions, as falling in with that class of
offenses which, being violations of the law of the land, have a tendency,
as it is said, to a breach of the peace, and are, therefore, cognizable by
that jurisdiction. Hence in an action for slander where the petition
charged the defendant with saying of the plaintiff that he tried to hire
a man to kill another, the court in Lee v. Stanfelt 7 says that these
words, alleged to have been spoken, charged the plaintiff with a misdemeanor, 'for the overt act of one attempting to hire another to commit murder, which is a felony, is a solicitation to commit a crime, constituting a misdemeanor at common law, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.'"
A majority of the courts hold that the solicitation to the commission
of an offense which neither by statute nor common law is a misdemeanor
is a substantive common law crime, at least if the crime solicited is
one tending to the disturbance of the peace or harmful to the public
welfare. In State v. Donovan 8 the court said: "Certainly to incite
or solicit another to commit a felony or other aggravated crime, whether
it be actually committed or not, is a misdemeanor at common law, and
generally speaking solicitations which in any way attach public society or
safety are indictable as distinct offenses."
More recent case of Wiseman v. Commonwealth 9 the court held
"that to invite or solicit one to commit crime, where no attempt is actually made to commit it, is indictable at common law as solicitation,
at least, but when it proceeds to point of some overt act in commission
of crime, it becomes attempt to commit crime, and is indictable as
such." A federal decision on this point was handed down in O'Malley
v. United States 10 where the court said, "In criminal law, he who
commands or procures a crime to be committed, is guilty of the criiie,
the act is his act, and he is present in purpose and design and acts by
his agent."
In State v. Beckwith 11 the court held that "solicitation of a felony
is an indictable offense at common law, whether or not the solicitation
is effected or the felony is in fact committed." The court said in In re
Malicard 12 that "solicitation to burn a boat insured against fire is a
6 In Rex v. Higgins (1801) 2 East. 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269.
7

s

171 Ky. 71, 186 S. W. 1196, (1916).
S Boyce (Del.) 40, 90 Ad. 220 (1914).

9 143 Va. Rep. 631, 130 S. E. 249 (1925).
10 128 F. (2d) 676 (1942).
11
12

135 Me.423, 198 A. 739 (1938).
211 N. C. 684, 191 S.E. 730 (1937).
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substantive common law offense." In State v. Dumais 13 the court
held in accord with State v. Beckwith, supra, and said that the solicitation of a felony is an indictable offense at common law. This same
view was held also in Commonwealth v. Wiswesser.14
In State v. Peterson15 it was held that one who has procured, counseled or commanded another to commit a crime may withdraw before
the act is done and avoid criminal responsibility by communicating the
fact of his withdrawal to the party who is to commit the crime.
Thomas F. Bremer.

THE POWER OF THE COURT TO REDUCE OR INCREASE VERDICT WITHOUT GIVING THE PARTY AFFECTED THE OPTION TO SUBMIT TO A NEW

TRIALu.--This problem, to be correctly understood, should be divided
into three distinct parts. These are: (1) The power of the court to
grant a remittiturwithout giving the plaintiff the option of a new trial,
(2) the power of the court to grant an additur or incressitur without
giving the defendant the option of a new trial, and (3) the right of the
court, without the defendant's consent, to deny a new trial upon the
condition of remittitur by the plaintiff.
With respect to the first part of the tri-fold problem presented, it
is well to note that it is a long standing practice for most courts to
give the plaintiff the option of avoiding a new trial by consenting to
a reduction of the verdict to an amount deemed proper by the court,
when in its opinion a verdict for unliquidated damages is excessive.
However, the courts almost unanimously hold that unless the party
in whose favor the verdict was rendered consents to the reduction that
the court cannot reduce the verdict of the jury in an action for unAn Ohio court, in an action for unliquidated
liquidated damages.'
damages, held,2 that neither a trial court nor any reviewing court has
the power to reduce the verdict of a jury, or to render judgment for a
lesser amount, without the consent of the party in whose favor the
verdict was rendered to such reduction. In the same decision the court
went on to say that a reduction of a verdict is possible without the
assent of the prevailing party, if, by undisputed testimony an error in
the mathematical calculation of the damages is pointed out, thereby
pointing out an exception to the general rule laid down.
18 137 Maine 95, 15 Atl. (2d) 289 (1940).
14 - Pa. Sup. Ct. -, 3 Atl. (2d) 983 (1939).
15 213 Minn. 56, 4 N. W. (2d) 826 (1942).
11, 124 N. E. 813 (1919). Duke v. Fargo, 172
1 Knight v. Seney, 290 Ill.
App. Div. 746, 158 N. Y. Supp. 1009 (1916).
2 Chester Park Co. v. Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N. E. 186 (1929).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the early 1920's held contra to
the general rule in a long line of cases. 3 The reason driving the Wisconsin Supreme court to take such a view was the desire to avoid
reversals and the necessity of new trials. In looking through the history of Wisconsin litigation involving this point it is easy to see that
this contrary holding to the general rule might be termed a fad of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court which began with the Karsteadt decision in
1922 and which was modified in 1927. In the latter year they held
that neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the power to
order a new trial in all cases where damages assessed by the jury are
either excessive or inadequate, in which the proper amount of the verdict
has to be determined upon some basis which fairly takes the judgment
of the jury for a guide of the independent judgment of the court. It
soon followed this decision by holding 5 that a case previously decided 6
in which the verdict was reduced without making the acceptance of the
reduction optional with the plaintiff, was modified in accordance with
the decision on the Campbell case, (citation 4) so as to provide that a
new trial would be granted unless the defendant would elect to allow
entry of judgment for the amount which the court in the first Rogers
v. Lurge Furniture Co. case had arbitrarily reduced the verdict, the
reduced amount being considered the highest amount that an unprejudiced jury could reasonably find under the facts of the case.
The next step in this paper entails the consideration of the power
of the court to increase verdicts without giving the defendant the
option of a new trial. The general rule is aptly stated by an Ohio
court. In a fairly recent decision of the Ohio Appellate tribunal 7 the
following view was held: that the trial court is without power arbitrarily
to increase the verdict of the jury without the consent of the party
prejudiced, as such action is violative of the constitutional guaranty
of trial by jury. The Washington court has taken the view 8 that in a
personal injury suit it is error for the trial judge to enter judgment
for the plaintiff in the amount of $800, such action increasing the verdict
of the jury by $600, nothwithstanding the fact that this was done in
pursuance of an election made in behalf of the plaintiff to accept such
an increased award rather than to have a new trial. This was held
to be, in effect, a denial of the defendant's right to trial by jury.
8 Karsteadt v. Phillip Gross Hardware & Supply Co. 179 Wisc. 110, 190 N. W.
844 (1922).
Wasicek v. Carpenter Baking Co., 179 Wisc. 274, 191 N. W. 503
(1923). Berghainmer v. Meyer, 189 Wisc. 197, 207 N. W. 289 (1926).
4 Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wisc 370, 214 N. W. 374 (1927).
5 Rogers v. Lurge Furniture Co., 193 Wisc. 496, 215 N. W. 457 (1927).
6 Rogers v. Lurge Furniture Co., 193 Wisc. 496, 211 N. W. 782 (1927).
7 American Railway Exp. Co. v. Bender, 20 Ohio App. 436, 152 N. E. 197
(1926).
8 Sigol v. Kaplan, 147 Wash. 269, 266 P. 154 (1928).

NOTES
A different view is taken by the Virginia courts. The Supreme
court of that state came to the following conclusion: 9 In an action for
damages for injury to a motor car sustained in a collision, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of $250. The defendant conceded that
$350 was the amount suffered by the plaintiff. The court held that the
jury's verdict fixed the question of liability and the defendant could
not complain when the trial court set aside the jury's verdict and entered
judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $350, although there was no
evidence to fix the plaintiff's damages at $250.
The Wisconsin court, along these lines, follows the majority rule.
In a very recent decision the court expounded 10 that in a case involving unliquidated damages, the amount found by the jury was
deemed by the trial court as wholly inadequate. The court remarked
that it seemed clear that the trial court might have granted a new
trial unless the plaintiff consented to take the judgment for such increased amount as would represent the least amount that an unprejudiced jury would find.
The third point we have to take up is the right of the court, without
the defendant's consent, to deny a new trial upon the condition of
remittitur by plaintiff. A long line of cases from several jurisdictions
have held that an excessive judgment may be cured by a voluntary
remittitur, or that a new trial may be denied or a judgment affirmed
on appeal on a condition of a remittitur against the defendant's objection.11 In the Texas Appellate court it was held 12 that where a judgment of the trial court of the plaintiff in an action for alienation of
affections was reversed because of prejudicial argument indulged in by
the attorney for the plaintiff, and in deference to this holding, the
plaintiff filed a substantial remittitur of a portion of the judgment,
which remittitur the defendant refused to accept, it was held that the
court was unable to give any effect to the same, for the reason that
there was no rule of law by which it was able to determine the extent
to which the improper argument affected the judgment. There are
scores of cases too numerous to cite on this point all of which hold as
does the Texas case.
In recapitulation, it is well to sum up the findings. They are: The
courts, in almost all jurisdictions, are powerless to reduce the damages
found by the jury without giving the plaintiff the option of a new
trial. Secondly, the court is without power to arbitrarily increase the
9 Apperson-Lee Motor Co. v. Ring, 150 Va. 283, 143 S. E. 694 (1928).
10 Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wisc. 270, 248 N. W. 127 (1933).
11 West. Union Telegraph Co. v. North, 177 Ala. 319, 58 So. 299 (1912).
St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co v. Adams, 74 Ark. 326, 109 Am. St. Rep. 85, 86 S. W.
287 (1905). Sandy v. Lake St. Elev. R. Co., 235 Ill. 194, 85 N. E. 300, (1908).
East Chicago v. Gilbert, 59 Ind. App. 631, 109 N. E. 404 (1915).
12 Nicholson v. Nicholson, (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. (2d) 514 (1929).
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verdict of the jury without the consent of the party prejudiced. Finally
that the court may lower the verdict of the jury, if, in its opinion it
appears excessive, but does not appear to have been influenced by
passion or prejudice, with the assent Is of the plaintiff to the sum
warranted by the evidence.
Norbert S. Wleklinski.

THE VALIDITY OF AUTOMOBILE PARKING ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS.-This subject is of particular interest at this time due to the
fact that a large number of cities are adopting parking-meter ordinances,
and also because many disputes and perplexing problems have been
raised in connection with their validity.
American Law Reports state that three major issues have arisen
concerning the validity of parking-meter ordinances: (1) whether or
not the installation of parking-meters in designated zones is a reasonable
exercise of the police power conferred by the legislature on the municipality; (2) assuming that the first issue is answered in the affirmative,
whether the meter charge imposed has some reasonable relation to the
expense of installation, operation, and maintenance of the system and
its general supervision, or whether the revenue resulting therefrom is
so clearly in excess of that cost that it must be construed as an authorized revenue measure; and (3) whether or not the physical presence
of parking meters in front of the premises of an abutting owner constitutes an unreasonable interference with his property rights, especially
of his right of ingress and egress.1
We shall first consider some of the cases holding parking-meter
ordinances invalid. In Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co.2
it was held that a municipal ordinance establishing a parking-meter
zone in a street which involves municipal revenue from the operation
of the meters, is an unauthorized exercise of taxing powers.
Mr. Justice Thomas speaking for the court said, "In short, the city
seeks to convert the said avenue into a parking lot, and charge the
public a fee for the use of the same; while in the adjoining blocks to
that in which complainant's property is located, no fee will be charged.
The effect of charging the parking fee for the privilege of parking in
the block upon which complainant's property is located will be to
divert traffic and travel from said block to adjoining or neighboring
blocks where no fee is charged, and where the public may have the
18 Deutsch & Balicer, How to Take an Appeal, Sec. 89, P. 201.
1
2

130 A. L. R. 316.
233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114, 108 A. L. R. 1140 (1937).
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privilege of using the streets of Birmingham without payment of a fee
for the use or hire thereof."
In M. E. Rhodes, Inc. et al., v. City of Raleigh 3 an ordinance
providing for a charge for parking on the city's streets by depositing
in a parking-meter a 5-cent coin for an hour's parking and a 1-cent
coin for twelve minutes parking, with the parking-meters displaying
signs indicating illegal parking when the paid for time limits were exceeded, was also held to be invalid on the following grounds: (1)
state statutes did not confer upon the city the necessary authority to
enact ordinances imposing a parking fee or a charge for parking space;
(2) the validity of the parking-meter ordinances could hardly be sustained on the theory that the meter charge was a proper inspection fee,
in as much as one who parks a motor vehicle is not, in that particular
act, engaged in any business or enterprise demanding inspection; nor
is he offering anything to the public the inspection of which is necessary
to the public health, safety or welfare; (3) there was no substantial
relation between the meter charge for parking space on the city's
streets and the correction of the evil resulting from the occupation of
a parking space by the same automobile for an unreasonable length
of time to the detriment of the rights of others, so as to give the
city authority under its statutory powers to regulate traffic; and (4)
the meter charge was in reality an "excise tax" for the privilege of
using parking space on the city's streets, and hence was a "revenue
measure" which the city lacked authority to impose.
Next, in Birodkey v. Sioux City-4 an ordinance establishing "parkingmeter zones" was held to be unenforceable although they were not
unconstitutional: (1) as constituting an improper delegation of authority; (2) as unreasonable;; and (3) were not related to the provisions and purposes of statutes governing the city planning commission so as to be invalid because the city council did not obtain recommendation of the city planning commission before their enactment, and
although the city had authority to interfere with public traffic by installing parking-meters on streets, so that such meters would not be
deemed "nuisances" unlawfully obstructing the use of streets, nevertheless such ordinances, as they were enforced and administered, were
not legitimate measures, but were unauthorized revenue-producing acts.
Mr. Justice Richards speaking for the court said, "Imposing parking charges for revenue-producing purposes being ultra vires, justification thereof if there be any in this case must be found in the measure
having been regulatory in character, exacting amounts that no more
than approximately reimburse the city's outlay for necessary supervision and enforcement. Expenditures of the city's funds for supervision and enforcement went no further than the payment of polices
4

217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. (2d) 389, 130 A. L. R. 311 (1940).
291 N. W. 171 (1940).
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men's salaries. No moneys went out of any of the city's funds for
meters. Upon the amount expended for policemen's salaries being
recovered out of the charges for parking, all funds of the city expended
for supervising and enforcing the regulations were restored. The
aggregate amount of these salaries for the three months the meters
were operated preceding the trial was but a small fractional part of
the total the public paid into the meters during the same period. The
revenues produced were greatly in excess of the amounts that would
reimburse the city. In these considerations is a negation that the
ordinances as enforced and administered, had the afore-mentioned
characteristitics of justifiable regulatory measures." 5
Let us now consider the cases of Shreveport v. Brister 6 and Monsour
v. Shreveport 7 wherein it was held that an ordinance of the city of
Shreveport, Louisiana stating that when any vehicle is parked in a
space adjacent to which a parking-meter is located, the operator of the
vehicle is under duty upon entering the parking space to deposit at
once a 5-cent coin in the parking-meter, for the purchase of sixty
minutes of time or a 1-cent coin for the purchase of twelve minutes
of time, and if he or she fails to do so, is subject to the penalty, imposes a "license fee" or a "tax" which the city exacts for the privilege
of parking on certain designated streets, and hence, the ordinance is
void, under a state statute providing that no municipality may impose
any tax, license, or excise of any character whatsoever "upon the exercise
of any right or privilege, or upon the performance of any act whatsoever, not taxed by the state" in the absence of special legislative
authority.
Now let us consider some of the cases holding parking-meter ordinances valid. In Owens v. Owens 8 a city ordinance of Columbia,
South Carolina providing for the maintenance of mechanical parkingmeters automatically registering the expiration of the time limit for
parking, for which a fee is charged, was held not to be invalid on the
ground that the city's purpose was to raise revenue under the guise
of obtaining funds for the enforcement of a police regulation, since
there was no evidence to establish that the revenue collected would
be in excess of the expenses of maintaining the parking-meter system.
Also it was held not to violate the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution, nor did it deny a traveler or an abutting property
owner equal protection of the law under the state constitution. The
ordinance the court further held, was valid as a proper regulation of
5 See 196 N. W. (2d) 352 where the case was affirmed on appeal (Feb. 18,
1941) with slight modification i. e. the court should have held that the city was imposing improper charges for parking vehicles and disposing of the revenue therefrom without lawful authority.
6 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1940).
7 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940).
8 193 S. C. 260, 8 S. E. (2d) 339 (1940).
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the privilege of parking automobiles on the streets, as against the contention that it sought to impose unlawfully a license on the use of
the streets.
In Ex Parte Harrison9 it was held that a parking-meter ordinance
of a home-rule city (Lubbock) prohibiting the parking of automobiles
in designated congested areas without a deposit of 5-cents in the
meter, was not a tax but rather a "license fee"' properly chargeable under
the police powers of the city. It was also held that the said ordinance
was within the general charter powers of the city, and was not violative
of the city's contractual authority over its streets. Judge Christian,
speaking for the court, said: "There is no doubt of the power of the
city to regulate the privileges of parking in the interest of the public
safety -nd good order * * * The power to regulate parking implies the
power to exact a fee of sufficient amount to cover the expenses of
maintaining the regulation. The regulative measure is not invalidated
because incidentally the city's receipts of moneys are increased."
Let us consider the case of Harper v. City of Wichita Falls 10 in
which the court of appeals of Texas affirmed a decision denying the
plaintiff, a jeweler, a temporary writ of injunction against the enforcement of a certain parking-meter ordinance passed by a home rule city
(Wichita Falls). The city caused a parking-meter to be erected directly in front of his store. The plaintiff contended that the parkingmeter ordinance was invalid on the ground that the ordinance was a
zoning ordinance within the meaning of a state statute, and was void
for failure of the city to publish prior notice of its passage, as required
by the provisions of the statute; that there was no proper relation between the erection and operation of the parking-meters and the authority vested in the city by its charter and statutes for the control
of its public streets; that the charges made for parking-meter service
were in excess of the amount which would be reasonable for the actual
maintenance of the same; that the plaintiff had lost $700.00 profits in
his business as the result of the maintenance of the said meters which
was properly chargeable as depreciation in the market value of his
leasehold interest in his place of business. The plaintiff also asserted
that the parking-meter ordinance was unreasonable and arbitrary.
Plaintiff further contended that the meter unlawfully interfered with
ingress and egress to his property, and unreasonably interfered with
the inherent right of private citizens of free use of the city streets, and
constituted a revenue-raising scheme not enacted for traffic regulation
and bearing no relation to the regulation of traffic.
The court, however, stated that it could not be said that the parking-meter ordinance had no proper relation to traffic, or that the city
contemplated or intended that it should be a tax measure. The court
9 135 Texas Crim. Rep. 611, 122 S. W. (2d) 314 (1938).
10 105 S. W. (2d) 743 (1937) Ct. of Civ. App. (Texas).
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held that the fee was merely to defray the expenses of operation of
its administration. The court further observed that although every
citizen, including owners and non-owners of abutting property have
the primary right to use the city streets for purposes of travel, and, as
an incident thereto, the right of ingress and egress to and from property
abutting on the streets for the purpose of loading and unloading
passengers, merchandise, and other commodities from vehicles, the
ordinance did not by its terms deny citizens such right. The court
also observed that parking-meter charges may operate to plaintiff's
advantage to lessen the occupancy of the parking space in front of his
business by others than his customers.
In Re Opinion of the Justices 11 the court said, "A municipality
cannot be authorized to turn this plan of using parking-meters into a
business for profit over and above the expenses involved in proper
regulation of the public use."
In the case of Hendricks v. Minneapolis 12 it was held that although the parking-meter ordinance of a city (Minneapolis) would
fail as a "revenue measure" if the receipts exceeded the cost of enforcement and regulation it would not fail as a tax if it remained within
these limitations.
The plaintiff property owner in Clark v. Newcastle ' sought to enjoin as a public nuisance a parking-meter on the public street in front
of his property. The plaintiff contended that it was illegal and void.
The injunction was refused. The court held that a municipality may
validly install a system of parking-meters upon its streets and charge a
fee for parking, so long as the amount charged bears a reasonable
relation to the service rendered and the cost thereof but that the
system cannot be sustained if it is a "revenue measure."
In City of Columbus v. Ward 14 the court said: "Such an ordinance
does not unreasonably interfere with or restrict any easement that
abutting property owners have of access to their property."
In Kimmel v. City of Spokane 15 it was held that the Supreme
Court would not go behind legislative declaration in City ordinance
(Spokane); that its purpose is regulatory, in the absence of evidence
tending to show that such ordinance is really a "revenue measure."
Finally we come to the case County Court of Webster County v.
Roman 16 wherein it was held that a state statute authorizing an unincorporated town "to regulate * * * the parking of vehicles upon any
designated streets" authorized the town (Addison) to provide for the
11
18

297 Mass. 559, 8 N. E. (2d) 179 (1937).
207 Ifinn. 151, 290 N. W. 428 (1940).
32 Pa. D. and C. 371.

14

65 Ohio App. 522, 31 N. E. (2d) 142 (1940).

15

7 Wash. Rep. (2d) 372, 109 P. (2d) 1069 (1941).

12

16

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 3 S. E. (2d) 631 (1939).
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installation of parking-meters on its streets. "There can be no serious
denial," Judge Hatcher speaking for the court said, "that parkingmeters are a means of regulating parking." The court rejected the
plaintiff's contention that the ordinance set up an unlawful system
of indirect taxation saying, "The present arrangement goes little, if
any further than to provide payment for the meters and their service.
The arrangement is analogous to the exaction of tolls for the maintenance of public highways and bridges."
Here we have a fairly complete analysis of the cases dealing
with the problem of the validity of parking-meter ordinances. It must
be borne in mind that while the weight of authority seems to be that
such ordinances are valid, it is by no means conclusive. As has been
shown, the law-makers must be very careful not to make parkingmeter ordinances a "revenue measure." So long as the amount collected for parking does not unreasonably exceed the expense of installation, operation and maintenance of the system, the courts will
usually uphold the ordinances. If this requirement is fulfilled, it has
been generally held that the installation of parking-meters in designated
zones is a reasonable exercise of the police power conferred on the
municipality by the legislature. 17
Alfred W. Trueax.

USE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW ORDERS OF ADMINIsTRATIVE

TRmuNA.s rN CoLoRAo.-With the ever increasing number of ad-

ministrative tribunals, both in federal and state governments, the acts,
procedure and judgments of those bodies have assumed an importance
commensurate in part at least with their numerical growth. With many
of the historical arguments of unlawful delegation of powers, both
legislative and judicial, having been answered by the courts in a manner
most encouraging to the proponents of administrative law it seems almost certain that the number of important administrative bodies will
increase rather than diminish in the years to come. Whether governmental expediency demands a further expansion of such bodies is not
material today because they have been bred and nurtured by sympathetic legislatures and courts and have become so much a part of our
governmental and judicial systems that it appears doubtful if such administrative tribunals will ever be removed from our governmental
system. What has been said of the federal administrative tribunals
applies with equal force to the various state boards and commissions
17 See also in this connection the following cases: Ex Parte Duncan, 179

Okla. 355, 65 Pac. (2d) 1015; Gilsey Buildings Inc. v. Incorporated Village of
Great Neck Plaza, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 604 (Sup. Ct. N. Y., Nassau Co, 1939);
State v. Goldberg, 61 R. I. 461, 1 Atl. (2d) 101 (1938).
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for the states have not allowed the federal' government an exclusive
monopoly on the establishment and maintenance of administrative
bodies.
The finality of an administrative tribunal's order depends to a
great extent upon the statute creating the body and upon the rules of
procedure of the particular jurisdiction. In this paper we shall examine
briefly the review of administrative orders by a writ of certiorari in
Colorado.
Perhaps the use of certiorari to review the orders of an administrative
body can best be seen in the appeals taken from orders of the Colorado
State Board of Medical Examiners. This board, created entirely by
statute, represents a typical administrative board of any state vested
with both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power. What may be
done in regard to its decision would seem to apply to the decisions of
any number of other boards of the same type in any of the various
states as the medical board represents a cross section of the manifold
administrative boards in existence, today.
A Colorado statute gives district courts the power to review certain
acts of the board: "The action of the state board of medical examiners in refusing to grant or in revoking a license to practice medicine
may be reviewed by the district court by the writ of certiorari under
the code of civil procedure." 1
Superficially read the provision would seem to guarantee the right
of a judicial review to any petitioner. With such apparent safeguards
as a review by a judicial body of the acts of an administrative agency
it would seem that the individual petitioner has ample checking power
on the capricious or arbitrary action of the boards and has adequate
appellate power. Theoretically, perhaps this is true but often the workings in practice manifests a situation quite different than one supposes
to be the case. Does a petitioner who has an adverse ruling by the
board have adequate grounds to protect his interests under the provisions of the Colorado statutes that give district courts the power to
review decisions of the state medical board by writs of certiorari?
That the various American jurisdictions vary materially as to the
right to and the scope and grounds for a writ of certiorari is not to be
doubted. The Colorado rule on this point is well settled and supported
by a myriad of reported cases as well as set forth in the statute books.'
The Colorado rule has been stated to be that the writ of certiorari will
serve to review only the jurisdictional objections to a board's actions
or a gross abuse of discretionary power. How the rule actually works
in practice can best be seen in adjudicated cases and it is to these
that we turn our attention.
I Colorado Statutes Annotated (1935).
Colorado Statutes Annotated (1935).
No. 106.
2

Vol. 4, Chapter 109, No. 13.
Vol. 1, Rules of Civil Procedure,
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In Thompson v. State Board of Medical Examiners the district
court judge said: "I understand that I have no right to pass upon
the merits of the case or the sufficiency of the evidence. From the
return it appears to me 'that the petitioner had a fair trial and that
the action of the board should be confirmed and the writ of certiorari
dismissed and discharged." 8
Three years later in State Board of Medical Examiners v. Noble the
exact point again came up and the court on appeal said: "The medical
board had jurisdiction of the subject and of the person and clearly did
not exceed its jurisdiction or abuse its discretion. On a review of its
action by writ of certiorari, those are the only questions to be considered. Whether its decision on the merits is right or wrong is not
within the issue." 4
A leading case on the subject of review from administrative orders
in Colorado is Dilliard v. State Board of Medical Examiners. In this
case the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed a decision of the district
court that had refused on a writ of certiorari to disturb a revocation
order issued by the board. The court said: "The district court had
no power to review the action of the board except for excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion. * * * So, under our Code, no act of any
tribunal within its jurisdiction and not greatly abusive of its discretion,
however erroneous it may be, can be reversed upon certiorari. Courts
can consider the evidence for no purpose except to see whether the
board exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. They may look
at the evidence to see whether the facts proved come within the terms
of the act, because otherwise they sometimes could not tell whether
the court had jurisdiction or abused discretion, but they can go no
further." 5
From the Dilliard case it seems to be settled law in Colorado that
the evidence considered in the board hearing cainot be considered for
any reason on appeal save to see if the jurisdiction was exceeded or
an abuse of discretion resulted. It cannot be weighed or considered
for any other than those two reasons. From that famous case it is
interesting to note that on appeal the upper court is powerless to reverse the board's judgment despite a manifest erroneous conclusion if
the board did not abuse its discretion and acted within its jurisdiction.
The opportunity presented to a petitioner to prove abuse of power of
the board, judging from the reported cases in which the appellate court
has sustained the board's revocation order, seems to be almost infinitesimal.
Also on point is White v. Andrew where the court said: "Upon
certiorari the court could review the board's action only upon a ques3
4
5

59 Colo. 549, 141 P. 436 (1915).
65 Colo. 410, 177 P. 141 (1918).
69 Colo. 575, 196 P. 866 (1921).
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tion of jurisdiction or great abuse of discretion. There was nothing,
therefore upon which the district court could reverse or modify the
board's action, and the judgment of dismissal was right." 6
Still another affirmation of the general rule is found in State Board
of Medical Examiners v. Brown where the court said: "The review
extends only to a determination, from the record alone, of the question
whether the inferior tribunal regularly pursued its authority and thereupon pronounced judgment accordingly. We have several times held
that a cause heard on certiorari could not be considered on its merits." 7
In Doran v. State Board of Medical Examiners we find the court
in almost identical language stating the rule to be: "This and other
courts have repeatedly held that the object of certiorari is not to settle
or determine disputed facts but to investigate and correct errors of
law of jurisdictional nature and under the Code of Procedure, abuse of
discretion." 8
Perhaps the outstanding case on this point in the jurisdiction is
Spears v. State Board of Medical Examiners.9 This bitterly contested
litigation went from the state examining board to the district court to
the state Supreme Court to the federal Supreme Court where it was
dismissed. 10 Spears, a Denver chiropractor, had his license revoked
for unprofessional and dishonorable conduct and then by a writ of
certiorari to the district court had the order of the board annulled and
from this order the board took an appeal to the state Supreme Court
which reversed the district court and affirmed the board's order of
revocation. The Supreme Court said: "Such finding, by the medical
tribunal, even if erroneous, that respondent's conduct was unprofessional
and dishonorable does not constitute a failure upon its part regularly
to pursue its authority, nor was it an abuse of discretion. In no event
was it, or could it be, other than a mistake in its finding of facts or
an erroneous conclusion from those facts, and we cannot even say it
was a mistake in either. By all of our cases on certiorari, the reviewing court may not enter upon the merits and has not the power to
correct a mistake of fact or an erroneous conclusion from the facts
made by the inferior tribunal." 11
Of the manifold number of cases reported there are few where a
petitioner has successfully been able to prove an abuse of discretionary
power by the board and have their revocation order annulled. The
outstanding case on this point is Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners.'2 Sapero, a Denver doctor, had been ordered by the board
70 Colo. g0, 197 P. 564 (1921).
70 Coo. 116, 198 P. 274 (1921).
78 Colo. 153, 240 P. 335 (1925).
9 79 Colo. 588, 247 P. 563 (1926).
10 48 S. Ct. 158 (1928).
11 79 Colo. 558, 247 P. 563 (1926).
6
7
8
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to cease the practice of medicine and had taken an appeal by a writ
of certiorari to the district court which had affirmed the revocation
order. He then took a writ of error to the state Supreme Court which
held that the board, though acting from honest and altruistic motives,
had abused its discretion, and sent the case back to the board with
instructions to dismiss the proceedings. In this case the court, following the rule pertaining to a review of the evidence as set forth in the
Dilliard case, reviewed the evidence to aid them in their determination
as to whether the board had abused its power.
In summary we are guided to an irresistible conclusion by the reported cases and that is that although there are statutory provisions
for an appeal and judicial review from an administrative board's orders
and that theoretically the grounds for judicial review are adequate,
in actual practice it becomes most difficult if not impossible to prove
an abuse of discretionary power or excessive jurisdiction of a board
composed of highly respected members of the medical profession. That
it has been done is not to be disputed but that the fate of those who
are called to account before such administrative bodies is .in the hands
of persons who, because of personal, political or professional reasons,
are not immune from acting arbitrarily or capriciously and from whose
decision there is little hope of successful appeal seems equally clear.
Such is the price we pay for governmental expediency under a government of administrative tribunals.

Francis J. Paulson.

